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23 juni 2016 stemte Britene nei til EU-medlemskap. I mange år hadde Storbritannia vært et 
vanskelig medlem av EU. For noen, spesielt på høyresiden av Britisk politikk hadde 
folkeavstemmingen om EU-medlemskap vært en lang drøm. Når Britene stemte den 23 Juni 
2016 hadde de ett spørsmål de skulle svare på, ja eller nei til EU-medlemskap. Spørsmålet 
er ekstremt komplisert. Dermed åpent det for flere aktører i debatten. Alle hadde sine 
meninger og argumenter. Noen historikere spilte også en rolle i den debatten.  
 
Denne oppgaven handler hovedsakelig om historikernes rolle i Brexit debatten. Fra 2013 
begynte et knippe historikere å samle seg i forskjellig grupper og nettverk. Historikere for 
Britain var gruppen hvor euro skeptiske historikere samlet seg, og Historikere for Britain i 
Europa var gruppen hvor pro-Europeiske historikere samlet seg. Det var andre mindre 
grupper også, men det var de to som var størst og hadde mest media opptredener. 
 
Hensikten med denne oppgaven er å se på hvilke grupper og nettverk av historikere som 
dukket opp i respons til Brexit debatten fra 2013 til 2016, samt hvilke aktiviteter og 
argumenter de fremmet. Jeg vil også se på om dette faktisk spilte noen rolle i debatten i det 
hele tatt. Ble historikerne tatt godt imot i debatten eller var det ingen som brydde seg? 
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Chapter 1: Introduction  
 
1.1 Brexit  
 
“Brexit means Brexit and we’re going to make a good job of it.”1 This is how Theresa May2 
opened her campaign speech to be Prime Minister, after the unexpected resignation of her 
predecessor David Cameron3. But what does Brexit actually mean? At the time of writing 
August 2018, over 2 years after the Brexit referendum, it is still unclear what Brexit actually 
means or what form it will take. Yes, Britain is leaving the European Union, however, is 
Britain going to stay in the Customs Union, the Single Market and stay subject to the 
European court of Justice jurisdiction? These items are just some of the many sticking points 
as to what form Brexit might take. Notable figures, such as, Tony Blair4, Sir Nick Clegg5 Sir 
John Major6 would like Brexit to be stopped completely and actively campaign for it. Such a 
complex debate on one of the most important issues in modern British history, didn’t just 
involve current and past politicians. Historians, were also actively involved in the debate 
                                                          
1 “‘Brexit means Brexit’, Theresa May lays out case for becoming PM.” 
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/video/news/video-1307374/Brexit-means-Brexit-Theresa-lays-case-
PM.html. (Retrieved, 29/04/2018).    
2 Theresa May, born 01/10/1956, Conservative Prime Minster of Great Britain, assumed office 
13/07/2016. Please note that I have strived to offer personal data on all actors in this thesis, 
although most of them will be familiar figures, perhaps especially to readers of a master thesis on 
this topic. The reason I have done this is twofold. Firstly, there is a tendency memory serves us 
better the closer we are to the actual events. In my experience, that is not always so. Second, it is 
my hope that this thesis will have a long life, and I acknowledge that what might be perceived as 
obvious to us contemporaries might not be the case to those who follow after us.   
3 David Cameron, born 09/10/1966, Conservative Prime Minster of Great Britain from 11/05/2010 to 
13/07/2016. 
4 Tony Blair, born 06/05/1953, Labour Prime Minster of Great Britain from 02/05/1997 until 
27/06/2007, Labours longest serving Prime Minster and arguably one of the most pro-European 
premiers. 
5 Sir Nick Clegg, born 07/01/1967, former Liberal Democrat Deputy Prime Minster in a coalition with 
the Conservatives, an outspoken pro-European.    
6 Sir John Major, born 29/03/1943, former Conservative Prime Minster of Great Britain, took Britain 
towards a political union with Europe by signing the Maastricht Treaty in 1993. 
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before and after the referendum. It is these historians, and the debate that went on between 




Great Britain has often been described as an ‘awkward partner’7 in the European Union. In 
some respects, this relationship can be seen to have become more awkward over time. 
‘Euroscepticism’ is a label often applied by the British media to describe those who are 
critical to closer integration between Britain and Europe.  The social scientists Ultan and 
Ornek offer the following broad definition of Euroscepticism, “critical practices that oppose 
European integration and contesting the European Union as a political entity”8. In this thesis, 
I will apply Ultan and Ornek’s definition, albeit not without some health warnings. First, it is 
important to be aware of the distinction between ‘Eurosceptism’ as a construct and a 
concept and the real-life phenomenon it sets out to describe. Second, although 
‘Eurosceptism’ has mainly been applied to members of the Conservative Party since the 
1990s, it is important to keep in mind that, the phenomena it sets out to describe can be 
found across a broad political spectrum. The European question has created a schism within 
as well as between parties. In more recent years, this has – amongst others – contributed to 
heavy intra-party fighting in the Conservative Party as well left-wing Labour politicians 
openly criticising the party line.        
 
Euroscepticism in Britain is not a new phenomenon as such, but can be said to have 
increased and intensified after the Maastricht Treaty came into force in 1993. At the time of 
the signing of the Treaty, the Prime Minister John Major even went as far as calling three of 
his cabinet colleagues ‘bastards’, in a now famous outburst recorded on video tape when 
Major had thought he was not being filmed.9 Eurosceptic Conservative Party MPs did not go 
away despite the signing of the Maastricht Treaty. They would go onto to be vocal and 
                                                          
7 Term coined by Stephen George in his book, An Awkward Partner, Britain in the European Union.  
8 Mehlika Ultan and Serdar Ornek, "Euroscepticism in the European Union," International Journal of 
Social Sciences IV, no. 2 (2015). p.49. 
9 Paul Routledge and Simon Hoggart, "Major Hits out at Cabinet," The Guardian 25/07/1993. 
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troublesome. According to Daniel Hannan10 the Conservative MEP and journalist, (one of 
the most vocal and influential campaigners in the run up to Brexit), this was a turning point 
as: “The Treaty added a political dimension to the existing market one. Along with this what 
had previously been the European Economic Community became the European Union”11 
Notably, Maastricht and the changes what came with it divided the public as well as 
politicians. The public, at times, became dismayed with how much they saw as the EU 
interfering with their lives. An example of this is, the attempt to introduce the metric system 
in place of the British imperial one, resulting in Sunderland market traders finding 
themselves in trouble for selling vegetables in pounds.12 A Eurobarometer13 survey in 2009 
showed the British to be amongst the most sceptical to the EU. 
 
In the 2010 general election, no party managed to win an outright majority. Most of the 
pollsters and experts had expected this to be the case in 2015 also. The Tories and the 
Liberal Democrats had spent the five previous years in an at what times has been described 
as a toxic coalition. In the 2015 General election, David Cameron feared losing votes to 
UKIP, particularly over the European issue. Perhaps it was this fear, and problems from 
long-standing Eurosceptics in his own party which led him to promise an EU referendum in 
the 2015 party manifesto. Historian and friend of Cameron Niall Ferguson14 thinks this 
manifesto promise was, “indispensable to the election victory. If this promise had not been 
made than UKIP would have been much more of threat, and there would have being a revolt 
in the shires.”15 Cameron even had the support of Europhile ministers in his party. Alistair 
                                                          
10 Daniel Hannan, born 01/09/1971, Conservative member of the European Parliament for South 
East England, well-known and outspoken Eurosceptic. 
11 Daniel Hannan, What Next (London: Head of Zeus, 2016). p.18.  
12 Robert Tombs, The English and Their History (Strand, London, England: Allen Lane, an imprint of 
Penguin Books, 2014). p.800. 
13 Public opinion surveys, conducted on the behalf on the European Commission.  
14 Niall Ferguson, born 18/04/1964, scholar of international history, senior fellow at the Hoover 
Institution, Stanford.  
15 Niall Ferguson discussion with Will Self 25/02/2018, London. 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FQghUuH5n2M (retrieved 20/03/2018). 
4 
 
Burt said, “he didn’t blame the Prime Minister for calling the referendum, ‘it was important 
not just for party management, but important for the country, that the people got the vote’.”16  
 
The Brexit referendum, took place on 23rd June 2016. The result was close with 52 percent 
of voters preferring Britain to leave the European Union. Just over 17 million people voted 
leave this is larger than any winning political party has ever won in British elections. A 
heated debate between The Remain campaign and The Leave campaign raged in the run-
up to the referendum. The debate is ongoing, often as to what form Brexit will take. 
Historians were also involved before the referendum and still are. Two notable groups of 
historians emerged before the referendum. Historians for Britain and Academics for Britain in 
Europe17. There were other groups, but it was these two which were the most significant in 
terms of media appearances and the research they published. This thesis will discuss both 
groups in detail, and present a history of historian’s involvement in the Brexit debate.     
 
1.2 Research status – historians, Britain and the EU 
 
The events this thesis will document and discuss are, as mentioned, relatively recent. Thus, 
there hasn’t been much research published on historian’s involvement in the Brexit debate. 
However, it is still possible to place phenomena studied here in a larger context as well as a 
research body. One alternative could have been to see the topic of this thesis as part of 
broader studies of academic as activists. In this analysis here, however, I have placed 
emphasis on the historical arguments of the actors. This makes identification of the main 
historiographical trends and positions of Britain’s relationship with Europe relevant.  
 
The political scientist Oliver Daddow, has written extensively on the historiography of Britain 
and Europe since 1945, and has emerged as one of the authorities in the field18. Daddow 
                                                          
16 Tim Shipman, All out War : The Full Story of How Brexit Sank Britain's Political Class (London: 
William Collins, an imprint of HarperCollins Publishers, 2016). p.13. 
17 Group was made up of a number of different professions, Historians for Britain in Europe, was the 
name the historians of the group gave themselves. 
18 Oliver Daddow, scholar who specialises in British foreign policy and its world role as well as British 
European policy. Presented a number of historiographical perspectives on British and European 
integration in his book Britain and Europe since 1945, published in 2004. In an article written in 
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has classified academic research and literature on Britain’s relationship with Europe into 
three different schools. He has classified early literature has ‘orthodox’, highlighting how 
earlier historians argued Britain ‘missed opportunities’ at European integration. His second 
school is revisionist, where he identifies later historians going against the conventional 
wisdom of Britain having ‘missed opportunities’, often after studying newly released 
documents from the National Archives. The third school is post-revisionist, where Daddow 
argues that there has being a form of a revision of revisionism since the 1990s. As with the 
revisionist school of historians, post-revisionists have relied heavily on the National Archives 
for source material. However, Daddow argues:  
 
they have organised their research in a different way, post-revisionists inject chaos and 
uncertainty into their narratives. They show British foreign policy to be more chaotic and 
disorderly than both the orthodox and revisionist historians.19  
 
As Daddow’s research shows, Britain and Europe since 1945 is a very much debated 
subject. It comes as no surprise, that this very debated area of history was very much 
discussed by historians as part of the Brexit debate. Previous research such as Daddow’s, 
shows that historiography of Britain’s relationship with Europe has changed markedly over 
time. 
 
Even though it is recent history, a number of books have already been published on the 
story of Brexit. For instance, political journalist Tim Shipman has used his vast list of political 
contacts to help him write his book All-out War, The full story of Brexit. One reviewer 
complimented Shipman’s work by stating, “there seems to be no one whom he hasn’t 
spoken and whose motives he does not pretty accurately portray and understand.”20  
Shipman’s actors were politicians, they were also his sources. My sources and actors, on 
                                                          
2006, Euroscepticism and the Culture of the Discipline of History, Daddow identifies the long strands 
of Eurosceptic opinion in English historiography. As well as pointing out the difficulties in debunking 
Eurosceptic opinion as it is so ingrained in English historiography. Both pieces have proven a 
valuable guide to this thesis, as well as some of the other articles Daddow has wrote.   
19 Oliver J. Daddow, Britain and Europe since 1945 : Historiographic Perspectives on Intergration 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2004). p.157. 
20 Will Hutton, "All out War; the Brexit Club; the Bad Boys of Brexit Review – Rollicking Referendum 
Recollections," The Guardian, 21/11/2016. 
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the other hand, will be historians. Historians in the Brexit debate is, to the best of my 
knowledge something which hasn’t had very much written about it. Shipman’s book seems 
to be the standard text on the story of Brexit as I write in August 2018, however, he makes 
no mention of any of the groups of historians which will be at the heart of this study. 
 
1.3 Theme, actors and research questions 
 
British historians have a long tradition of involvement in political debate. Take, for instance, 
the Marxist historians E.P. Thompson and Eric Hobsbawn. Both were members of The 
Communist Party of Great Britain, and played an active role in left-wing politics throughout 
their lives. In this thesis, I study two constellations of historians that both set their marks on 
the Brexit debate: Historians for Britain and Historians for Britain in Europe. In the Brexit 
debate, it was Historians for Britain whom appeared to have got involved first. Their first 
appearance in the national press was via a letter to the Times in July 2013. Looking at their 
name, it would hardly come as a surprise that Historians for Britain proposed a Eurosceptic 
view on both the past and the present. They were soon followed by Historians for Britain in 
Europe, which can be seen as a counterpart to Historians for Britain. Both parties were 
active in the public debate and both parties had fully operational websites in the run-up to 
the referendum and immediately after.21   
 
Historians involvement in the Brexit debate is worthy of further study. The article Rival 
historians trade blows over Brexit, written by the influential and award-winning journalist 
Gideon Rachman, was published in the Financial Times just before the referendum.22 Here 
Rachman, himself a historian by training, emphasised how the debate between historians 
began quite politely, but escalated in terms of arguments as well as temperature. This thesis 
will address the entire process by investigating further the roles historians played before and 
after the referendum.         
                                                          
21 Thankfully, I saved some of the research they published before the websites were taken down. It is 
worth noting that the original web address for Historians for Britain is now in use again. However, 
whoever is using it has nothing to do with the group I will discuss in this thesis. This is very clear 
when one takes a look through the content there. I have attempted to contact whoever runs the 
website now but I have received no response.  
22 The Financial Times, May 13th, 2016. 
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The two principal research questions addressed in this master thesis are: 
 
 What activities and arguments did Historians for Britain and Historians for Britain in 
Europe promote? 
 
 How and why did the involvement of historians effect the Brexit debate as well as 
communities of British historians involved in it?  
 
In addition, several sub-questions will be addressed such as for instance - did historians 
getting involved in politics come at a price? What effect – if any – did the involvement of 
historians have on the Brexit debate? Did historians bring something others didn’t, for 
example? After all, what is stopping others using the past for political purposes?  
 
1.4 Sources   
 
In order to answer questions, I like other historians – depend on my sources. In this section, 
I will outline the different types of sources which could be utilised in this thesis. I will discuss 
in turn the possibilities for each type of source as well as their limitations.  
 
 
Firstly, on source work in general I will follow some of the points E.H. Carr23 made in his 
critically acclaimed book What is History. Although, it is now over fifty years since Carr 
published this work some of his points still have relevance today. Carr’s work was criticised 
by some of his peers at the time. For instance, G.R. Elton24 called into question some of 
Carr’s arguments which I will go into in the following paragraph.   
                                                          
23 Edward Carr, 28/06/1892 – 03/11/1982, English historian, author of What is history? first 
published in 1961, in this book Carr lays out a number of historiographical principles which at the 
time went against historical practice and methods, the book is still widely studied today. 
24 G.R. Elton, 17/08/1921 – 04/12/1991, German-born British political historian, Regius Professor of 




How should one approach working with sources relevant to this very politicised area of 
history? Firstly, it is worth bearing in mind one of Carr’s famous quotes. “Study the historian 
before you begin to study the facts”25 Historians serve as both actors and sources in this 
project, therefore, it is of importance that I study them, particularly in such a politicised area. 
I have done this by looking over their previous publications, looking to see if they are 
affiliated to a university, if so which, do they have any political affiliations? In particular for 
this thesis, did the historian I am writing about have an affiliation with any of the groups I 
have introduced in this chapter. Today, historians may be hesitant to use the word facts. I 
can change Carr’s quote slightly to, “study the historian before you begin to study their 
research.”26 Nowadays facts are often disputed no matter how distinguished the researcher.  
 
Carr argued that facts of the past did not become facts of history until it comes up in one or 
two historical accounts. Thus, placing the emphasis on the historian’s interpretation of the 
facts. Elton argued that, “this was an arrogant attitude to both the past and to the place of 
the historian studying it.”27 Disagreements between distinguished historians aren’t anything 
new as these quotes show. Historians in the Brexit debate, at times, publically disagreed 
with what Carr would call historical facts. Another of Carr’s arguments was on the idea of 
history being used to better understand the future. Richard Evans28 has called this usage of 
history into question, “historians are no more capable of imagining or predicting the future 
than anyone else.”29. According to Evans’s argument, it is worth proceeding with a degree of 
caution when history is discussed with an eye on what might happen in the future. In the 
Brexit debate, actors from various professions offered their views and arguments on how 
they seen Britain’s future, inside or outside the EU. In such a debate historians can also play 
                                                          
25 Edward Hallett Carr and Richard J. Evans, What Is History?, 2nd ed., repr. with new introd. ed. 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001). p.17. 
26 Ibid. p.17. 
27 G. R. Elton, The Practice of History (Sydney, 
London,: Sydney U.P.; 
Methuen, 1967). p.75-76. 
28 Richard Evans, born 29/09/1947, British historian of 19th and 20th century Europe, Regius Professor 
of history until his retirement in 2008.  
29 Richard J. Evans, In Defence of History (London: Granta, 1997). p.229. 
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a role, however, as Evans argues they aren’t any better than anyone else at predicting what 
might happen. What the future will hold for Britain outside the EU remains very much go be 
seen.  
 
1.4.1 Interviews  
 
In hierarchical terms, interviews will be at the top of the sources in this master project. The 
interviews add a dimension to the analysis that goes beyond the scope of the written 
sources. Interviews are sources that otherwise would not have existed. Thus, working with 
oral sources also enlarges the scope of a history project such as this by not only describing 
and analysing actors and events, but documenting it too. 
 
How should one then approach using interviews as potential oral sources in a project such 
as this? According to John Tosh30, one should approach them as any other source “with 
historian’s traditional critical analysis skills.”31 “Interviewees may indeed want to get ‘their’ 
version of events on record”32. Whilst, this is all well and good for me, as it is after all ‘their’ 
version of events I am looking for. It is still very important to follow what John Tosh says on 
the use of oral sources. As I have stated they are at the top of the hierarchy, but this doesn’t 
mean they are approached any differently. Critical analysis skills and keeping a distance 
from the interviewee is necessary, especially in such a polarised area of history. 
 
I have been able to interview two key players in the historical side of the Brexit debate. My 
first interviewee, was Paul Lay33. Lay is the editor of History Today a monthly UK based 
history magazine. Lays, position as editor has put him in a particularly interesting place as a 
close-up understanding of both debates – and at times lack of it between historians. I have 
                                                          
30 John Tosh, British historian, well-known for his work as historiographer.  
31 John Tosh and Seán Lang, The Pursuit of History : Aims, Methods and New Directions in the Study 
of Modern History, 4th ed. ed. (Harlow: Pearson Education, 2006). p.334. 
32 Ibid. p.335. 
33 Paul Lay, editor of History Today Magazine where a number of exchanges between historian’s pre-
referendum took place. 
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also interviewed Oliver Lewis34. Lewis was with Historians for Britain from the start and wrote 
some of the research they published on their website. Lewis, was able to provide me with 
some very interesting insights on Historians for Britain as well as the historical side of the 
Brexit debate. 
 
My interviewees have provided me with the most important sources for this thesis. I have 
been able to see differing insider’s perspectives on the debate, which have proven 
invaluable. In short, I don’t think I could have found what they told me anywhere else at the 
time being. In practical terms, the face to face interviews have also taken the most effort on 
my part. I have travelled from Norway to London twice, as well as taken time to write the 
interview guides and digest what I got from the interviews.       
 
 
For a number or practical reasons, it was necessary to use email correspondence in this 
project. As most of the historians hoped to interview are based in the UK, it hasn’t always 
been possible for me to arrange to interview them. Even when this has been possible from 
my side these historians are busy academics and haven’t always had time to accommodate 
me. While these historians also act as interviewees, it is important to note I did not meet 
them face to face. Therefore, I haven’t gained as much from them as I have from interviews 
with Paul Lay and Oliver Lewis. Meeting people face to face allowed for a much more open 
discussion, what I gained from these two meetings has proven invaluable for this thesis. 
 
1.4.2 Blogs 
   
Some other important source material I will use in this project, is the research which was 
published by the historical actors in the run-up to the referendum. Often this was published 
in blog form on their respective websites.  
 
                                                          
34 Oliver Lewis, former research director at Business for Britain, had the original idea for a group such 
as Historians for Britain. 
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These blogs show how historians used their knowledge of the past to contribute to the Brexit 
debate. Some used their knowledge of history to present a sceptical view of Britain’s 
relationship with Europe while others made a pro-European case. I have used these blogs to 
present an analysis of historian’s response to the debate, and to detail what activities and 
arguments they promoted. I won’t be taking sides, I will be using blogs as source material for 
discussion. How should I approach source work with blogs? I think it is worth looking at 
some of Ludmilla Jordanova35 points here. An important point from Jordanova to bear in 
mind is, “the dramas of politics shape historical practice.”36 Brexit is a great political drama. 
As well as its dramas shaping historical practice, historians also attempted to shape political 
drama via the use of their expertise. History also has opportunities in such drama:  
 
public history has huge potential to make fundamental contribution to politics and policies, 
however, the costs of ignorance of the belief systems and past histories are potentially huge 
too.37 
 
Here the historical response to the Brexit debate is a good example of the potential public 
history has. I think the points I have raised here from Jordanova’s book History in Practice, 
are worth having in mind for working with the blogs published in the run-up to the Brexit 
referendum.    
 
1.4.3 Newspapers and magazines   
 
 
Newspapers have a threefold value to the historian:  
 
                                                          
35 Ludmilla Jordanova, born 10/10/1949, British historian, has written broadly on the nature of the 
subject of history, her book History in Practice is widely studied. 
36 L. J. Jordanova, History in Practice, 2nd ed. (London: Hodder Arnold, 2006). p.173. 
37 Ibid. p.173. 
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they record political and social views which made an impact at the time, they provide a day-
to-day record of events and lastly, they present results of more thorough enquires into 
issues beyond the scope of routine news reporting.38  
 
It is for these reasons that I will also use newspapers in this master’s project. While I have 
outlined a number of strengths newspapers have it is equally important to be aware of their 
weaknesses. One must be aware of the bias found in British newspapers. In particular, on 
the issue of Brexit, some newspapers wanted Britain to remain, for instance, the Guardian. 
On the other hand, others preferred Britain to leave the EU, for example, the Daily Mail and 
the Express. It is important to be aware of the political stance of any newspaper which is 
used in a historical project. 
 
Some of the main exchanges between historians during the Brexit debate took place in a 
monthly history magazine History Today. The magazine caters for history enthusiasts. From 
ancient to contemporary history, History Today attempts to entertain and inform those who 
are interested in the past. Perhaps then it is unsurprising that it was such a magazine where 
exchanges took place. After all, the historians who involved themselves in the Brexit debate 
are more likely to well received in a history magazine than in a national daily newspaper with 
a much wider audience. Other magazines, such as, the Economist are also useful here. The 
Economist is published weekly and caters for those with a particular interest in current 
affairs.      
 
1.5 Sources and literature as a unified universe  
 
I have now outlined the different types of sources and literature I will use to help me to 
present answers to my research questions. I have also discussed the reasons why they are 
useful for this master thesis. While the interviews I will conduct are at the top of the 
hierarchy, it is important for me to use all the sources and literature together as a unified 
universe. This quote from John Tosh illustrates the importance of using them together; 
“Each type of source possesses certain strengths and weaknesses; considered together, 
and compared one against the other, there is at least a chance that they will reveal 
                                                          
38 Tosh and Lang. (2006): p.66-67. 
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something very close to the truth.”39 It is in this light I will work with my sources throughout 
this thesis. 
 
1.6 Approach  
 
As previously mentioned, the work on this thesis has involved, locating as well as generating 
sources. As British historian Peter Burke has pointed out, “when asking new kinds of 
questions about the past, for these new objects of research I will have to look for new kinds 
of sources.”40 The interviews with historians who are also actors in this project, are examples 
of such new sources.  
 
These sources have truly enriched this project. Yet, oral sources like any other source 
should be treated with a critical eye. In this project, they offer the important insider 
perspective of events. Me being the interviewer as well as the historian has some steps 
which should be followed whilst using interviews as oral sources. “Historians must accept 
responsibility for their share in creating new evidence.”41 In my own case, submitting this 
project in Norway I have informed the Norwegian data authorities of this project. My 
interviewees have also given me their consent to use the interviews in this project. Finally, it 
is up to me to zoom out from interviewees arguments and points. This approach will enable 
me to present a scholarly account of historian’s involvement in the Brexit referendum.  
 
These primary sources aren’t enough on their own to write this thesis. “They must be used 
alongside secondary material and have bearing on my research questions.”42 Chapter 2, will 
be exclusively written with the aid of literature and secondary sources. In this chapter, 
political memoirs can provide valuable first-hand accounts of events. There are some 
                                                          
39 Ibid. (2006): p.103. 
40 Peter Burke, New Perspectives on Historical Writing (University Park, Pa.: Pennsylvania State 
University Press, 1992). p.12. 
41 Tosh and Lang. (2006): p. 318. 
42 Jeremy Black and Donald M. MacRaild, Studying History, 3rd ed. ed. (Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2007). p.213. 
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common pitfalls to bear in mind while using political memoirs to reconstruct events. The 
obvious being that a politician may be very keen to present a more favourable view of 
themselves. This is hardly something new or unique for British politicians. In 2004, Daddow 
argued that something that was special to the topic of Britain and Europe in such memoirs is 
how “the history of Britain’s European policy is often treated as a side in such works. The 
second issue is that British politicians have neither the time nor interest, to devote much 
attention to Europe.”43 I think the latter may have changed in recent years.  
 
The analysis offered in chapter 3-5 are based on both sources and relevant literature. The 
literature I have used is relevant in the respect it has helped me and I hope the reader to 
better understand the source material I deploy. Still some principal comments are required. 
My understanding of ‘primary sources’ is broad and eclectic and stretches from face-to-face 
interviews, emails to printed texts. It is my hope that this pluralism will help, “generate more 
powerful insights, than if I had only used one type of source.”44  Furthermore, the historian 
Richard Evans underscores the importance of reflecting, “derive principally from present day 
concerns and from questions present day theories and ideas lead me to formulate.”45 In 
short, the polarised situation of Brexit is important to have in mind whilst working with this 
thesis. This polarisation can be seen in various newspaper and magazine articles, as well as 
the blogs and articles some of the historians wrote.  
 
1.7 Britain, England and all that – some terminology  
 
 
At times in this thesis I will refer to British history as well as English history. This may seem a 
little complex but there are some reasons for doing this. Historians for Britain, despite the 
name mainly discuss English history. For instance, the idea of Common Law is actually 
English. However, if one is writing a history of England it is difficult to do so without 
discussing, Scotland, Wales, Northern Ireland as well as England. My intention is to try and 
present the best analysis of historian’s responses to the Brexit debate. Where I think this is 
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best served by saying British history I will do this, where I think it best by saying English 
history I will do so.  
    
1.8 Thesis structure   
 
 
The chapters in this thesis are principally set out in chronological order. In chapter 2, I will 
discuss Britain’s relationship with Europe post 1945. While I won’t answer my research 
questions directly in this chapter. It is important to have some historical context, so that the 
reader can better understand the later empirical chapters. I have chosen to include events 
which I think will help the reader to better understand the later chapters.   
 
Chapter 3 will begin with the letter twenty-two historians signed in the Times newspaper 
published in July 2013. The letters title is Time for ‘a better deal’ with the EU. This letter 
marks the beginning of historian’s involvement in the Brexit debate. I will look at how other 
historians responded to this letter, and how the debate began to take place between 
historians.   
 
In chapter 4, I will continue to discuss the debate between historians. This took place via a 
number of platforms. In this particular chapter, I will discuss historians debating each other 
on TV and radio. As well as how some of the British media outlets responded to historian’s 
involvement in the Brexit debate. 
 
Chapter 5 will analyse the aftermath of the Brexit referendum, particularly the aftermath 
concerning historians. I will discuss what happened to some of the groups of historians I 
discussed in previous chapters. The Brexit debate didn’t stop after the referendum. It is 
ongoing mainly as to what form Brexit ought to take. Some historians are active in this 
debate, I will analyse some of their arguments in this chapter.  
 







Chapter 2: Britain’s relationship with Europe post 1945 
   
 
From its attitudes to sex and marriage to its literature and its coinage, its food and the shape 
of its cities, Britain had chosen different solutions from those favoured across the Channel 
and beyond the Rhine, ones which were more individual and self-reliant, which depended 
more upon individual conscience and liberty, and less upon imposed authority.46   
 
2.1 Introduction  
 
The following chapter will discuss Britain’s relationship with Europe after 1945. Although this 
thesis will mainly address very recent history namely historians in the Brexit debate, 
previous historical events are quintessential to this debate, especially the developments 
after 1945. 
 
Although, Britain finished the war on the winning side, this victory did not come without a 
heavy price for both Britain and her society. What was certain afterwards was: that Britain 
was no longer a superpower, it was the United States and the USSR whom emerged as the 
two world superpowers. According to historian Tony Judt47 the Europe which emerged after 
the war was: “was a Europe of nation states more ethnically homogenous than ever 
before.”48  How would Britain find its way in Europe after the war?  This chapter will look at 
how Britain attempted to find its way in Europe, at home and on the global stage at a time 
when it became clear that a new world order was in the making. 
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2.2 Missed opportunities?  
 
In 1950, the French foreign minister Robert Schuman announced a plan for France and 
Germany to pool coal and steel production and invited other states to join them. Schuman 
hoped that such co-operation would make war between France and Germany impossible. 
“The British were invited to participate, but declined.”49 What were the reasons for the lack of 
participation by the British? One could argue that, it would have made sense for a Britain in 
decline to have some sort of economic alliance with her European neighbours. Moreover, a 
more integrated Europe would likely be one were the horrors of The Two World wars 
wouldn’t be repeated. It was no accident that the two things to be pooled were coal and 
steel. By doing this the chance of future wars between France and Germany would be 
reduced significantly.  
 
Early historians of European integration argued that Britain had missed ‘opportunities’, 
‘boats’ and ‘buses’. According to the political scientist Stephen George, “in its early days, the 
European Community took on a shape that suited the original six members far better than it 
suited Britain.”50 So why did Britain choose not to join her closet neighbours in the early days 
of European integration? There were a number of reasons for the British not taking part in 
1950. British labour politician Herbert Morrison famously said, “‘we cannot do it, the Durham 
miners won’t wear it’. This statement shows Labour’s fears of surrendering one of their key 
national industries to European control.”51 This quotation is a timely one. The newly 
nationalised mines were a very powerful industry in 1950s Britain. Furthermore, a socialist 
Labour government wouldn’t want to upset a heavily unionised workforce by given the 
Europeans some controls over the industry. Great Britain, no longer has any active coal 
mines, however, the issue of British sovereignty never went away. It was one of the main 
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arguments made by the leave side in the Brexit referendum, that Britain ought to take back 
control over its own affairs.     
 
The European Coal and Steel Community ECSC was established after the signing of the 
Treaty of Paris by the six52 in April 1951. Historians of European integration Gowland and 
others argue that, “Britain was a notable absentee. The supranational dimension of the plan 
was ultimately the formal major obstacle to British membership.”53 Furthermore, the British 
Labour government had just nationalised the coal mines. The desire wasn’t there to pool 
control of them with the Europeans when nationalisation had just been completed. In 1950, 
The Korean War began this turned Britain’s attention away from Europe. This early chance 
of European integration was passed up by Britain, it is still debated as to whether this was 
an ‘opportunity missed’, or not. 
 
Another frequently deployed argument in the Brexit debate was on the notion that European 
Union has kept peace in Europe, Eurosceptics have argued that this isn’t the case. Europe 
has experienced bloody wars spanning back centuries. Although the continent has still seen 
wars since the formation of the EEC, they haven’t been anywhere near the scale of the Two 
World Wars of the 20th century.  There have been a number of attempts to form a common 
European defence policy and even a European army. The British, as with other previous 
attempts at European integration met this effort too with reluctance. 
 
The idea of military union in Europe was put onto the agenda around the time of the 
outbreak of war on the Korean Peninsula in 1950. The Americans, worried about the spread 
of communism wanted a common European defence policy. This also appealed to French 
visionary Jean Monnet. The crisis in Korea created the perfect conditions for him to try and 
gather support for military union. This was no easy task, the main issue being the re-arming 
of West Germany. It was initially US Sectary of State Acheson who made the proposal to the 
British and the French. His reasons for this were: the weakness of NATO defences and the 
US not wanting to bear the burden of Western defence alone. With West Germany now seen 
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as a loyal ally this seemed like a natural step. “British foreign sectary Bevin was in favour of 
the idea. However, the French were not, their fear of Germany was still evident.”54 
 
Monnet went to his political ally the then Prime Minister of France Renè Pleven for help, the 
result was the ‘Pleven Plan’ which Monnet himself actually drew up. “The plan would allow 
German rearmament – without giving the Germans any military independence.”55 The British 
having already rejected any involvement in the ECSC would not favour this attempt at 
European integration. Ultimately, Monnet’s vision failed to materialise, it wasn’t ratified in the 
French national assembly. The issue of European defence remained a sticky one, with 
various future attempts at a common European defence policy not getting very far.  
    
The six members of the ECSC signed the treaty of Rome in 1957, this set up the European 
Economic Community and the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom). Once again, 
the British didn’t join her European neighbours. This was in spite of fears of any form of 
economic integration without the UK could potentially lead to German hegemony over 
Europe. Whilst, a major step towards European integration, “The Rome Treaty represented 
for the most part a declaration of future good intentions.”56 The EEC’s aim was to create a 
common market and a customs union to allow easier trade between members, as well as 
free movement of capital and labour. The goal of Euratom was the joint development of 
nuclear energy.  
 
Why once again had the British backed out of closer co-operation with her European 
neighbours?  Academics offer differing opinions on this. For example, British academic 
Andrew Gamble argues that, “Britain wished to continue with her global responsibilities, as 
well as maintaining both leadership of Europe of The Commonwealth.”57 Historian Tony Judt 
had a slightly different take as to the reasons for Britain not signing the treaty; stressing the 
weaknesses and divisions in Europe Judt argues, “ the British did not yet understand their 
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situation, therefore, they declined to join the EEC.”58  The debate amongst historians and 
academics to the reasons for Britain backing away from European integration, on this 
occasion and others, has raged for many years.  
 
2.3 A change of stanch? British applications to join the EEC  
 
 
Great Britain made two attempts to join the EEC, or what many at the time referred to as 
The Common Market before eventually joining in 1973. The Common Market was the free 
trading area amongst other EEC members. The first application to join was made between 
1961-63 and the second in 1967. I will now discuss these applications, and some of the 
reasons historians give as to why Britain didn’t join the EEC on these occasions.   
 
It was Conservative Prime Minister Harold Macmillan who attempted to first take Britain into 
the Common Market. The Conservative Party is now known for hosting some of the most 
Eurosceptic factions in British politics, it is interesting that it was Conservative Prime Minister 
Edward Heath59 who first took Britain into EEC. 43 years later David Cameron another 
Conservative Prime Minister called the Brexit referendum, the result of which will lead to 
Britain leaving the EU. These are three major events in the history of British and European 
integration. All three events are very different but one thing is common, they all happened 
under Conservative Prime Ministers.   
 
One should first turn to the creation of the European Free Trade Association, in 1960, if one 
is to understand the reasons for the British applications to join the EEC. Britain and seven60 
other nations set up EFTA. Like the EEC, the idea was to establish free trade between 
members. Two notable differences were: the opposition to external tariffs and not seeing the 
need for supranational institutions. Why would Britain apply to join the EEC so soon after the 
creation of EFTA? There are a number of possible reasons here in economic terms, “EFTA 
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was much smaller than the EEC and it brought few economic benefits to Britain.”61 John 
Young also argues that; “Macmillan backed the EFTA arrangement. It was the belief at the 
time, that the EEC would be more willing to talk to successful trading bloc.”62    
 
Europe was now split into two different trading blocs. What was clear from the EFTA 
arrangements, was that Britain preferred free trading agreements without political 
commitments or economic integration. With this setting how would the British desire to join 
the EEC be met? The Americans were keen for Britain to join the EEC they disliked EFTA. 
Washington valued the EEC, “as a barrier against Communism.”63 Dean Acheson President 
Kennedys special advisor at the time of the application had said that, “‘Britain has lost an 
empire but was yet to find a role’”.64 Acheson went further on the application calling it a, 
“‘decisive turning point’”.65 However, American intervention didn’t help Britain on this 
occasion.  
 
The French provided the most opposition to the British application. British historian Robert 
Tombs66 argues that, “Charles de Gaulle the Prime Minister of France wanted to make 
France the leader of Europe.”67 De Gaulle vetoed Macmillan’s application in 1963, on the 
grounds that:  
 
England is an Island, sea-going, bound up by its trade, its markets, it food supplies, with the 
most varied and often the most distant countries. This would disrupt what he called a truly 
European Europe.68  
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Macmillan would eventually resign his position on health grounds later in 1963. He had been 
humiliated by the De Gaulle veto. The EEC had begun to take shape without Britain. The 
general consensus from historians was that Britain had missed a number of opportunities to 
shape Europe in the post-war years. However, some have questioned this particularly from 
1990s onwards. The availability of documents released in the National Archives after 30 
years has provided historians with an array of source material. By using these sources, 
historians have questioned the conventional wisdom that Britain ‘missed opportunities’ in the 
early days of the European Community.  
 
Labour under Harold Wilson69 came to power in 1964. Despite the good publicity and 
favourable public opinion Wilson got, this was far from a landslide victory and things wouldn’t 
be easy for Labour from the onset. How would this new minority government with a popular 
leader fare in Europe? British historian Martin Pugh argues Wilson, “wanted to modernise 
British Society. Yet his external affairs policies, especially towards the USA and defence, 
proved Conservative and traditional.”70   
 
As the 1960s drew on, it became clear that economic and political pressures forced the 
Labour government to revise its external policies. Britain’s economy was in decline, “whist 
EEC continued to develop and show stronger growth.”71 The special relationship with the 
USA was rather different than what one might be used to today. Wilson gave his support for 
the USA’s war in Vietnam, however, this wasn’t backed with troops. Something markedly 
different from the future Labour governments of Tony Blair. Labours cabinet was growing old 
which meant Wilson had to change things round. Notable promotions were the pro-
European Roy Jenkins to Chancellor and the left winger Tony Benn to cabinet. The 
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Conservative journalist Peter Hitchens72 describes Jenkins as, “As the Europhile of 
Europhiles, he done more to push Britain towards European integration than even Edward 
Heath.”73 It was Jenkins who was convinced that Britain’s future lay in Europe. This also 
meant giving up Britain’s old imperial role, something his older colleagues still held dear. 
 
Wilson’s position on Europe was more difficult to pin-point. He was known for saying one 
thing to pro-Europeans and something else to Eurosceptics. Wilson announced in 1966 that 
there would be another application to join the EEC. In 1967, Britain made her second bid to 
join the EEC. “As with previous applications De Gaulle saw the application more as a matter 
of expediency than conviction, and vetoed it in November 1967.”74 Historians have debated 
this matter ever since. This second rejection added weight to the ‘missed opportunities’ 
argument. Once again, for those that thought Britain should have taken a leading role in 
Europe earlier, Britain had come to the table far too late. 
 
2.4 A new Era? EEC entry, Renegotiation and Britain’s first 
referendum on membership 
 
The 1970s were a turbulent decade in Great Britain as elsewhere: industrial unrest, large 
strikes, high inflation, football hooliganism and a struggling economy were just some of the 
problems Britain faced. It was also the decade which saw Britain join some of her European 
neighbours in an economic union the EEC. It was a Conservative government under Edward 
Heath, arguably Britain’s most pro-European Prime Minister who took Britain into the EEC. It 
was a Labour Prime Minister, Harold Wilson, who attempted to renegotiate the terms of 
British EEC membership and gave the British people their first say on membership. 
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2.4.1 EEC entry 
 
According to John Young “it was clear that Heath would press for EEC membership more 
than Wilson.”75 Why was this the case? There a number of reasons here, importantly the 
Conservative Party was much less divided over Europe than the Labour Party. This is a 
situation which would be reversed in the 1990s with the Conservative Party becoming the 
most Eurosceptic of the two main parties. Personally, Heath thought “that EEC entry would 
force British industry to become more competitive thus would hopefully transform the 
country’s future.”76 Heath carefully choose his new cabinet to contain supporters of EEC 
entry.  
 
The conditions for Heath to negotiate entry were also better than they had been under 
previous attempts. The position of Sterling and the trade balance had improved. Perhaps it 
was this what led to a softening of attitudes amongst the British political parties to EEC 
entry. The six members of the EEC were also more open to talks on wider membership. 
Heath, had previously been the British negotiator in 1961-2 this argues Pugh “gave him a 
clear grasp of the difficulties, especially the weakness of Britain’s position.”77 So unlike 
previous Prime Ministers, Heath was prepared to accept the EEC as it was. He wouldn’t 
argue for a special deal or better terms for Britain.    
 
Heath was able to win over the French whom had previously blocked British efforts for EEC 
entry. The bill (to allow Britain to join) which had to pass through parliament was very 
detailed, therefore, it wasn’t until January 1st, 1973 that Britain officially became a member of 
the EEC. Sadly, for Heath his premiership wouldn’t last very long after this. The government 
which he led was brought down by an economic crisis, and the mobilisation of the trade 
unions against his government. Labour under Harold Wilson, came to power in 1974, and 
with it came more drama in Britain’s relationship with the EEC. Wilson, would also inherit the 
domestic problems which brought down Heath, in addition to this his own party was deeply 
divided over the European issue.  
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2.4.2 Wilson’s Renegotiations  
 
The EEC or The Common Market78 membership had a major effect on the 1974 election. 
Enoch Powell the right-wing Conservative firebrand recommended that, “Conservative 
opponents of the EEC should vote Labour.”79 Wilson played into this and fear over higher 
food prices. Labours election manifesto promised: 
 
to renegotiate the terms of entry, reduce Britain’s financial contribution and secure better 
terms for Commonwealth countries; it also promised a popular vote on membership, with the 
implication that Britain might withdraw.80 
 
Labour, having won the election had to follow through on some of these promises or at least 
attempt to.  
 
Wilson began formal renegotiations in June 1974. “The cabinet decided not to seek changes 
to the existing EEC treaties, this limited what the British could actually get.”81 40 years later, 
Conservative Prime Minister David Cameron would find it difficult to negotiate a better deal 
with the EU the successor of the EEC for Britain. Cameron too had called referendum and 
went to the EU to try and get ‘a better deal’ for Britain. They are parallels which can be 
drawn with Wilson’s renegotiations and Cameron’s some years later. Cameron too, was 
desperate to maintain party unity, the European issue had blighted the Conservative party 
for years. What is clear from both renegotiation efforts is: despite been from two different 
political parties, and been two very different Prime Minsters some years apart, it is no easy 
task for a British Prime Minister to get ‘a better deal’ from Europe. 
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Did Wilson actually achieve anything in these renegotiations which he could present to the 
British people? Comparatively little is the general consensuses amongst historians. Items 
which featured most prominently on the agenda were: 
 
the reform of the Common Agricultural Policy CAP, a reduction in the UKs contribution to the 
community budget and an extension of guaranteed EEC market access to Caribbean sugar 
producers and New Zealand farmers.82  
 
It was these items I have discussed here which Wilson presented to the British people. 
According to George he presented them to the British press as, “an unequivocal acceptance 
of the British demands, a capitulation of the foreign dragons to the courage of the British 
champion.”83  However, Gowland and others paint a different picture, “domestic opinion was 
sharply divided on what it achieved.”84 Wilson, hoped these terms would help him win a 
referendum for continued British EEC membership. 
 
2.4.3 1975s Referendum on EEC membership 
 
Britons got their first say on EEC membership on 5th June 1975. Wilson’s government was 
split, and he allowed his ministers to campaign on either side of the argument. As in the 
2016 referendum, the Remain Campaign was far better funded than the Leave Campaign. 
The majority of the political parties and politicians also campaigned for remain in 1975 and 
2016. One of the notable differences between 1975s and 2016s was the support of the 
media. In 1975, the vast majority of the media were in favour of remain. However, in 2016 
this wasn’t the case Oliver Daddow argues that, “in a variety of ways and for various reasons 
the British media, have been on a journey between 1973 and the present from permissive 
consensus to destructive dissent.”85 This change in stance in the media meant politicians 
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found it increasingly difficult to make the positive case for British membership of the EU. The 
EU also became a scapegoat for many problems in Britain.  
 
The Remain Side won the referendum in 1975, by a comfortable margin. Gowland and 
others point out that, “the referendum provided a clear endorsement of British membership 
of the EEC.”86 The anti-marketeers didn’t go away, they became known as Eurosceptics as 
time went by. The signal was clear in 1975, however, some fought a long battle for another 
referendum. An important point of note is that Britons voted to remain part of an economic 
partnership with their European neighbours in 1975. As I have outlined earlier the economic 
conditions in Britain weren’t great in the 1970s, so it was thought an economic union was a 
good idea. By the time of the referendum in 2016, Britain was part of a political as well as an 
economic union. It has been said some of the people who voted yes in 1975 voted leave in 
2016. The reason behind this is they believed in the economic union and saw the possible 
benefits in 1975. However, they wanted little part in a political union and what they saw as 
the EU interfering in British affairs.   
 
2.5 A new dawn? British European policy after The Maastricht 
Treaty 
 
According to the Daily Telegraph, “the history of the modern Eurosceptic movement begins 
with Margaret Thatcher’s87 1988 speech in Bruges.”88 The article goes onto argue that 
Eurosceptism was traditionally the role of the left. The left seen the EEC as a capitalist club 
and an obstacle in the way of a truly socialist Britain. However, this view eroded over time 
with the left realising Europe was a way of introducing socialism via the back door. “Thatcher 
set out to define a new Conservative take on the then EEC. She identified the two 
Foundational principles of the movement which were national sovereignty and genuine free 
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markets.”89 Thatcher had set out a dream for many Eurosceptics here, a vision of a very 
different Britain, a Britain which would be a truly independent nation state.  
 
2.5.1 The Maastricht Treaty 
 
Great Britain signed and adopted the terms of The Maastricht Treaty. Thus, the union with 
Europe was no longer just an economic one, it became a political one as well. The British 
people got no say in the terms of a referendum on this. Given that in 1975 Britons had voted 
to remain part of an economic union, it comes as little surprise there were significant 
divisions in British politics over Maastricht, particularly, in the Conservative Party. Some 
Conservative MPs were proud of Britain’s ancient institutions, and saw the need to protect 
them against what they saw as the erosion of sovereignty to the EU. Although some Labour 
MPs would have shared the same views, it was the Conservatives who saw the most 
infighting over Maastricht. Daddow points out that:  
 
The Conservative Party discovered in the Maastricht negotiations, the effects of which are 
still being felt, the issue of Europe has the potential to create as many tensions within 
Britain’s two leading parties as between them.90  
 
The Conservatives under Major won the 1992 general election. Major inherited four 
problems which would haunt his successors too: Europe, “The Persian Gulf, Ireland and the 
Balkans.”91 Why were certain members of Major’s party so angry over The Maastricht 
Treaty? The most publicised issue at Maastricht according to Judt was, “the talk of a 
common European currency, this also caught the attention of the public.”92 The UK signed 
the main body of the treaty but opted out of the proposed common currency. Judt argues 
that, “any step towards integration put off Britain, they seen it as a further step to a European 
super state.”93 Ken Clarke, one of Major’s cabinet ministers and longstanding pro-European 
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states that, “ the cabinet had agreed to support the treaty, so long as Britain was allowed the 
option of ‘not necessarily’ participating in the creation of the single currency and Social 
Chapter.”94 Clarke gives the picture of unity here, however, “there were twenty-two rebel 
Conservative MPs who voted against the Maastricht Bill almost bringing down the 
government they were part of.”95    
 
But why were these twenty-two MPs so disloyal to their party and Prime Minister? 
Importantly, the rebellion was backed by former Prime Minister Margret Thatcher. Although 
she resigned her premiership she had been forced into this decision by members of her own 
party. Those loyal to Thatcher had never forgiven those who had forced her out. 
Significantly, Thatcher herself had said she would not have signed the Maastricht Bill. 
Major’s election victory in 1992 was somewhat of a surprise for pundits but it did help 
legitimise his premiership. Gowland and others point out that, “this victory came at a high 
price for Major. Firstly, some of the new Conservative MPs proved to be highly Eurosceptic. 
Secondly, the governments majority was slashed from 88 to just 21.”96 Although minority 
governments can help governments to keep their rebels in line, on such controversial issues 
as Europe things can be a lot more difficult.  
 
For the British Eurosceptics, any attempts at closer European integration have always been 
met with scorn. Long-term Conservative Eurosceptics such as Bill Cash and Bernard Jenkin 
were never going to accept Maastricht. Despite the fact Major had won important 
concessions such as the opt out on the proposed common currency. The Maastricht 
rebellion also attracted some new Eurosceptics who would go on to make significant 
contributions to their cause, for example, Daniel Hannan97. “Hannan wrote to the twenty-two 
rebellious MPs and offered himself as a researcher. Around a dozen of them formed the 
European research group, with Hannan as its secretary.”98 The Guardian columnist Sam 
Knight whom I quote here, has even went as far as to writing an essay on Hannan, 
describing him as ‘the man who brought you Brexit’. Another British journalist Tim Shipman 
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has described Hannan as, “the intellectual godfather of what would become The Leave 
campaign.”99 The Maastricht rebellion marked the beginning of the modern Eurosceptic 
movement. Although very much on the side-lines for a number of years, it was partly 
because of these persistent, hard-working Eurosceptics that David Cameron called a 
referendum on EU membership. Moreover, without their hard work and campaigning in the 
run-up to the referendum there would have been no Brexit.      
 
2.5.2 New Labour and Europe 
 
Labour won the 1997 general election by a landslide. Tony Blair was the man who took 
Labour from opposition to a party of government. From been a largely left wing, Eurosceptic 
party in the 70s Labour moved to become a centrist pro-European party. By the time of the 
Brexit referendum hardly any Labour MPs openly campaigned for leave. Blair had flooded 
the party with centrist candidates side-lining the left and the Eurosceptics. This was a 
remarkable journey for a party, especially considering the traditional working-class Labour 
areas largely voted to leave the EU, often by a large majority. Labour MPs who continue to 
make the case for leaving EU find themselves very much on the side-lines. For example, 
Frank Field, who represents Birkenhead, has attempted to smooth the Brexit process by 
trying to set a fixed date for leaving in parliament. His own constituency voted leave, yet 
despite this his efforts have been met with scorn from his fellow Labour MPs. As with the 
Conservative Party, Europe has proved a very decisive issue for Labour.    
 
Blair himself would reside in Ten Downing Street from 1997 till 2007. From the onset of his 
premiership Blair liked to have control. After 18 years of Tory rule it felt like a new dawn had 
broken in Britain, and Blair was keen to make the most of this. Blair, a self-described 
‘modern’ man was keen to have control of all aspects of government. In fact, “it became 
popular to characterise Blair’s style as presidential and to associate government policy on 
Europe with the Prime Minister.”100 However, with thorny issues such as the single currency 
this would be no easy ride for the Blair. How, then would Blair address the issues between 
Britain and the European Union, and get the ever increasing Eurosceptic British public on-
board.  
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Daddow, in his study of British and European integration points out that:  
 
Blair drew on post-war developments in European integration to argue that, ‘the history of 
our engagement with Europe is one of opportunities missed - and Britain suffering as a 
result’.”101  
 
This is an extract of Blair’s speech to mark the opening of the European Research Institute 
at the University of Birmingham. Blair ended the speech by saying, “‘Britain’s future is 
Europe’.”102 Blair would seem very much to be aware of the history of the topic in this 
speech. He believed that Britain had missed out in the past as many historians of British and 
European integration have argued. It is also clear that he intended his tenure to be different, 
a one where Britain wouldn’t miss out, and would find its future in Europe. But would Blair be 
any more successful than those who had served before him? Moreover, would Blair be able 
to convince the ever-increasing Eurosceptic British public that Britain’s future lay in Europe? 
The public had given Blair a very large mandate in 1997, but Blair would see this decrease 
in future elections. The distrust over Blair’s European policy, and the disastrous Iraq war 
were part of the reasons for this marked decrease in popularity. 
 
Blair makes a number of points on Europe in his memoirs, while one should proceed with 
caution when using a politician’s memoirs as a source. In the case of Blair, it is very likely 
that he wanted to create a positive image for himself after leaving office, particularly given 
that his image had been scarred greatly over the Iraq war. Nonetheless, it is interesting to 
get Blair’s personal views on Europe which help to better understand British European policy 
during his time in office. 
 
Blair described himself as a ‘modern’ man and his views on Europe were no different: 
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For me, Europe was a simple issue. It was to do with the modern world. I supported the 
Europe ideal, it was utterly straightforward: in a world of new emerging powers, Britain 
needed Europe in order to exert influence and advance its interests. It wasn’t complicated. It 
was a practical question of realpolitik.103   
 
As leader of the opposition Blair had received advice from other world leaders as to how to 
lead and govern. The leader of Singapore gave Blair the following advice on governing: 
“keep the Thatcher reforms but get rid of this madness on Europe. Britain can’t afford to be 
out of Europe in the world as it is today.”104 Blair also claims he was also told the same thing 
by the Indian Prime Minister and the Chinese. From this one can conclude that Blair was a 
pro-European leader. Maybe it was the other world leaders whom had had an influence on 
Blair, or maybe he genuinely believed Britain’s future lay in Europe. Whatever the case, Blair 
and new Labour would push Britain much closer to European integration making him 
arguably Britain’s most pro-European leader since Edward Heath. 
 
2.5.3 The accession of the A10 countries 
 
In May 2004, ten105 new countries became full members of the European Union. The original 
European Community the forerunner of the EU was made up of six founding members, at 
the time of writing the European Union now has 28 full members. With membership came 
the free movement of goods, capital and labour. With average wages been considerably less 
in, for example, Poland and Hungary in comparison to other EU members, such as, Britain 
and Germany, it is understandable that some Poles and Hungarians, for instance, would 
seek to work in other EU member states. This presented a problem to the richer 
longstanding EU members. Would the richer countries suddenly be full of newcomers 
seeking work and a place to live? 
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To counter this, the EU put in place transitional rules which basically meant that member 
states didn’t have to take in migrants from new members states straight away. Germany, for 
example, followed these transitional rules, interestingly Great Britain didn’t. Why did Britain 
choose not to adopt the same rules which Germany had done? The Germans were able to 
control migrant numbers right up until 2011. Yet Britain decided to open up its doors straight 
away.  In his memoirs Blair states, “we had been staunch advocates of enlargement. It was 
a big moment.”106 This was the biggest enlargement of the EU, it was indeed a big moment. 
In a Daily Telegraph article from 2000 Blair had stated his desire for a ‘larger’ EU. “on 
enlargement, he called for the first wave of applicant countries, to be made members in time 
to take part for the 2004 Euro elections.”107 Clearly Blair had a desire to follow this policy 
through and that he did. As to opting out of transnational immigration controls, perhaps Blair 
was trying to improve his image abroad, it had been severely damaged over Iraq. On the 
other hand, perhaps he was following his belief that Britain’s future lay in Europe and the 
integration in 2004 was part of that future. Blair’s decision would have a profound impact on 
British society and it was an impact which the Eurosceptics would use to further argue their 
case. 
 
Blair, has recently stated that, “he underestimated the number of workers from the new 
member states who came to the UK to work after 1 May 2004.”108 However, he was also 
keen to stress that, “it was a very different time back then and the economy was doing 
well.”109 It seems like Blair hadn’t thought through how much stress this would place on 
schools and other public services. It would also force wages down, something Blair has also 
recently admitted; however, he claims this was only a slight decrease. The people who were 
most aggrieved about such changes in British society mainly came from working class 
areas; ironically from traditionally strong Labour Party areas. However, in light of the new 
direction taken by the Labour Party coupled with the new immigration policy, they began to 
find themselves politically homeless.  
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Why were the British working class so annoyed? The vast majority of the new migrants 
worked hard, paid their taxes and generally made good contributions to British society. 
Some of the public believed (fuelled by Britain’s Eurosceptic media), that the new arrivals 
were stealing their jobs, doing jobs cheaper, particularly, in the building trade, and using 
public services which either they didn’t have access to themselves or had to wait a long time 
to access such as the National Health Service. Such sentiments would fuel a new kind of 
Eurosceptism, a one still concerned about British sovereignty, but notably more xenophobic 
than the type of Eurosceptism found on the right of the Tory Party and on the left of the 
Labour Party.  
 
There were many benefits of New Labour’s mass immigration policies. New workers, mainly 
from Eastern Europe came to Britain and worked hard paid their taxes and made a 
contribution to British society. However, there were some negative consequences as well. In 
a very short space of time British society was changed significantly and perhaps irreversibly. 
The new immigrants required places to live and work, whole streets and estates were 
changed in a very short space of time. It was predominately young men whom came to work 
in the UK. Streets which had previously been full of families suddenly found themselves 
sharing the street with lots of young men. Wages, in traditional working-class jobs such as 
building work went down significantly in a short space of time. For Instance, in 2004, the day 
rate for a brick-layer in Southampton was £120, a year later it was £60 pound.110   For 
others, however, these changes were positive, “the results in London and especially for 
middle-class Londoners have been highly positive, a new multitude of cheap servants are 
now available.”111 While some seen the benefits of this policy, a great many didn’t see any. 
Ironically, it was those whom the Labour Party had traditionally represented who arguably 
seen the least benefits. New Labour had become more of a middle-class liberal party than a 
party which represented the working classes. In the Brexit referendum, the least affluent 
parts of Britain mainly voted Leave. In the next section I will discuss UKIP who were able to 
tap into these disenfranchised voters and help bring about Brexit.         
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2.5.4 Populism and Eurosceptism  
 
The United Kingdom Independence Party UKIP was founded by historian Alan Sked, 
originally Sked had founded the Anti-Federalist League in 1991 to campaign against the 
Maastricht Treaty. In 1993, Sked happy with how he performed when standing for election 
changed the party name to UKIP. Sked’s aims were to run a moderate anti-Brussels party, 
perhaps this is why in 1997 he resigned from the party. Sked was interviewed in 2014 by the 
Guardian newspaper, the title of the article quoting sked, ‘the party has become a 
Frankenstein’s monster’ says a lot about what Sked thinks about the party he created. Sked 
points out that, “prior to 1997 prospective party members had to sympathetic to the 
following: It’s a non-sectarian, non-racist party with no prejudices against foreigners or lawful 
minorities of any kind.”112 Sked goes on to say that he had no other option but to resign in 
1997 due to the party been taken over by the far-right.  
 
After Sked left, the criteria he had set down for prospective members was scrapped. The 
party went from been a liberal democratic one, to a populist far-right party who would benefit 
greatly from the institution they claimed to want to leave. Sked, never had any intention of 
sending candidates to Brussels to serve as MEPs. The new style UKIP had every intention 
of doing this to claim the very generous expenses which an MEP can claim, ironically UKIP 
would have struggled to exist without the generous funds from the EU. Former party leader, 
Nigel Farage, even went as far as boasting “he claimed over 2 million pounds in expenses 
from the EU to fund his anti-EU message.”113  
 
UKIP funded by wealthy backers such as Aaron Banks and EU expenses would go to have 
a profound effect on British politics. The first past the post electoral system in Britain meant 
despite been able to get many votes they struggled to get MPs into Westminster. However, 
European parliament elections were a different story, the turnout is traditionally much lower 
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at European elections than national ones. “With each direct election to the European 
parliament the turnout fell.”114 Add to this the proportional representation system of 
European elections, and it becomes fertile ground for far-right parties across the European 
Union. Discussing the EUs enlargement in 2004 Judt points out that, “the enlargement itself 
helped trigger this backlash. In Britain, the Europhobic UKIP and white-supremacist British 
National Party between them took 21 percent of the vote, promising to keep the UK clear of 
‘Europe’ and protect it from the anticipated onrush of immigrants.”115  
 
So, while been able to get candidates into the European Parliament via elections not many 
cared about how would UKIP have any effects on politics in Britain? UKIP mainly took votes 
from Labour in traditional working-class areas, areas which hadn’t benefitted as much from 
migration as metropolitan cities such as London had. People also like to use Europe as 
some sort of scapegoat for their problems, this was a message also conveyed by some of 
the British press, the Sun and Daily Mail, for example. Traditional British working-class areas 
were perfect for UKIP, while it was extremely difficult to get a candidate into Westminster, 
they done enough to frighten Labour and at times the Conservatives that they may lose a 
seat to UKIP and pressure them into more Eurosceptic policies. The fear of losing votes to 
UKIP was one of the reasons Prime Minister David Cameron called a referendum on EU 
membership. Some Eurosceptic Conservative voters had strayed over to UKIP as well as 
two of his own MPs whom defected to UKIP. Despite never been much of a presence in 
Westminster ultimately UKIP got what they wanted, a referendum on EU membership. 
 
2.6 Concluding remarks 
 
Stephen George coined the term ‘an awkward partner’ in his 1990 book, An awkward 
partner Britain in the European Community. As I have discussed the term is very apt when 
describing Britain’s relationship with Europe. The original European community became the 
European Union in the 1990s. Since then Britain has remained an awkward partner often to 
the dismay of her European allies. Historians and academics have disagreed on Britain’s 
place in Europe and on European integration. At times politicians have drawn on historical 
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arguments to make their case both on the pro-European side and Eurosceptic side. Britain’s 
two main political parties have been and still are very divided over the European issue. The 
divisions in the Conservative Party, and fear of losing votes to UKIP were two of the factors 
which contributed to the calling of Britain’s second referendum on EU membership. Some of 
the events I have discussed in this chapter were hotly debated by all sides in the run-up to 








The following chapter will begin by analysing the letter Historians for Britain wrote to the 
Times, on 3rd July 2013. To the best of my knowledge, this was the first offering from 
Historians for Britain, and for that matter any other historians in a national media platform to 
the debate on Britain’s place in Europe. At this stage, it was still unclear as to whether there 
would be a referendum on EU membership. It was, however, suspected that it may well be 
on the horizon in the not so distance future, and of course hoped for by Eurosceptics. This 
letter marks the beginning of the historical side of the debate something which would 
continue right up to the Brexit referendum, and afterwards. Eurosceptic British academics 
are nothing new. What was new is a group of historians coming together in the way 
Historians for Britain in this particular debate. In this chapter, I will discuss the reasons for 
the formation of this group and others as well as their motivations for doing so. I will also 
look at what arguments and activities these groups of historians promoted. The time period 
for this chapter is 2013-2016. This will allow me to discuss the contributions of my actors to 
the debate up until the referendum.  
 
3.2 Historians for Britain letter to the Times  
 
Historians of diverse areas of the past and from various political schools of thought made 
their views known to the public: before, during and after the Brexit debate. Historians for 
Britain went to the national press on July 3rd, 2013, they wrote a letter which was published 
in the Times calling for a ‘better deal’ with the EU.116 They began the letter by offering old 
arguments such as: Britain has developed traditions and practices which are peculiar to our 
shores, ideas such as Common Law and parliamentary sovereignty to the struggle for 
greater democracy and fairness.  
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These arguments featured prominently in Alan MacFarlane’s117 1978 book, The Origins of 
English individualism. MacFarlane’s work caused controversy when it was published.  
 
MacFarlane went against conventional views propounded by influential scholars such as 
Marx, Weber and Macauley. He argued, that the English peasantry declined as a social 
group, production became more market focussed and rural ‘individualism’ arose. By placing 
these events in 13th century, he argued, that England was ‘different’ from the rest of Europe 
for at least 500 preceding the industrial revolution.118  
 
One could perhaps also categorise Historians for Britain arguments as a kind of English119 
Sonderweg. Sonderweg is a term most often associated with German history:  
 
In the late 19th and early 20th century, many German historians were convinced of the 
existence of a positive ‘German Way’. They liked to stress certain basic German specifics, 
consistent with the German geographical and historical pattern.120  
 
One could also apply this term to Historians for Britain’s interpretation of English history, 
they argue throughout that English history has followed a ‘special path’ setting it apart from 
its European neighbours.    
 
The arguments that, “Britain has developed traditions and practices peculiar to our 
shores,”121 aren’t, as MacFarlane’s work demonstrates anything new. 20th century historical 
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scholars such as G.M. Trevelyan122 and A.J.P. Taylor123, have also argued that, “English 
history was exceptional, with particular reference to its separation from the continent.”124  
What was new with the arguments made in the Times was a group of historians invoking 
arguments on English exceptionalism, to make the case for ‘a better deal’ with the EU in 
2013, and going to the national press with it. At this stage, the group wanted to see if the 
British government could change Britain’s membership to protect British values. Although 
the list of signatories to this letter was short (twenty-two), this does not mean that it was 
insignificant.  
 
The historians who signed the letter are well known amongst academics and some of them 
are well-known to the British public. Most of them, were affiliated with a university. In an 
interview with Historians for Britain founder Oliver Lewis I found out the reasoning for the list 
been rather short. Lewis argued that, they went for quality over quantity. An effort was also 
made to have a right/left split in terms of politics. The left-wing historians proved more 
difficult to recruit. Having David Starkey125,on-board was important to Historians for Britain. 
Starkey is well known to the British people as he is regularly features on TV and radio. 
Having photos of David Starkey beside David Abulafia126, ticked all the boxes according to 
Lewis, there was one of Britain’s most televised historians next to the distinguished 
academic Abulafia.127  
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3.2.1 The formation of Historians for Britain and Academics for Britain in 
Europe    
 
In the summer of 2012, veteran Eurosceptic Conservative MEP Daniel Hannan met with the 
British political strategist and lobbyist Matthew Elliot. It was at this meeting he asked Elliot to 
run a campaign to make the case for Great Britain to leave the European Union. Hannan 
was so impressed with how Elliot had run the campaign no to AV128 (alternative vote system) 
against the rails, that he asked him to run the campaign what would eventually become Vote 
Leave. According to the Guardian columnist Sam Knight, “since the age of 19 Hannan has 
devoted his life to making the case for the UK to leave the EU.”129 He has mainly done this 
from across the Channel, as an MEP130 based in Brussels. Soon after the meeting in 2012, 
Hannan and Elliot set about starting Business for Britain a Eurosceptic think-tank. Their idea 
was to set up a number of sectoral groups, such as, farmers for Britain, students for Britain 
and Sikhs for Britain. Hannan mentioned a number groups in his book published after the 
referendum victory called What Next. Historians for Britain is one of the sectoral groups 
Hannan mentioned.   
 
David Abulafia was the chairman of Historians for Britain, board members were: Dr Shelia 
Lawlor (director of a right-wing think-tank and a historian), Dr Andrew Roberts131 and Dr 
David Starkey. One could make the argument that the board members of Historians for 
Britain were all well-established historians. Would this have any impact on the number of 
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historians they attracted to contribute research and support the group? Would a right/left 
split in terms of political stance be achievable? Arguably desirable, as they are a number of 
left and right Eurosceptic arguments, as well as the potential to better engage with the 
public. Would a gender balance be achievable or at least something close to one? I will offer 
insights to these questions in the following chapters.   
 
Academics for Britain in Europe, had supporters from various academic disciplines including 
history. One click on the historians section of the website will take the reader into Historians 
for Britain in Europe. Andrew Knapp132 is a British historian whose main research interests 
are the French government and politics. Knapp is a supporter of Historians for Britain in 
Europe. In 2017, he reflected on his involvement with the group and the Brexit debate, and 
subsequently published an article in a French academic journal. Knapp, has also been kind 
to send me a copy of this. Like their counterparts Historians for Britain in Europe also started 
by writing a letter to the Times. Knapp has stated that he cares about Britain’s relationship 
with the EU. Having taken early retirement in 2015 he thought they really weren’t any 
excuses not to get involved in the debate. Previously, Knapp hadn’t involved himself much in 
politics.133  
 
It was Knapp who decided to write the letter to the Times, having been provoked by a very 
belated awareness of the existence of Historians for Britain, who Knapp seen as opponents. 
The draft was done by Knapp, Beatrice Heuser a historian of international relations and 
Richard Overy the military historian. They argue in the letter that, the challenges facing 
Britain, for instance, “a confrontational Russia, multiple conflicts in the Middle East and a 
refugee crisis are better faced co-operatively with the EU.”134 This is a very different 
argument than the one Historians for Britain deployed. According to Historians for Britain in 
Europe, British history had not followed ‘a special path’, on the contrary they argue that, 
Britain is better off when part of a union with her European neighbours, and its history only 
understood as part of a greater whole.    
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133 Andrew Knapp, "Historians for Britain in Europe – a Personal History," Historie@Politique 31, no. 
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3.2.2 Historians for Britain overview  
 
In an email correspondence between myself and Oliver Lewis, Lewis pointed out that David 
Abulafia was one of main driving forces behind the campaign. Lewis helped set up the group 
when he was working at the Eurosceptic think-tank Business for Britain. Lewis also had the 
idea of getting historians to write a letter to the Times making the case for ‘a better deal’ with 
the EU. Lewis, had taken some inspiration from a letter a group of historians had written to 
the same newspaper urging people to vote no to AV. Historians, including David Abulafia, 
David Starkey and Niall Ferguson used historical arguments to make the case not to reform 
the voting system135. However, on that occasion it was just a letter. Historians for Britain 
would go much further than writing a letter to the Times.136 While trying to gather signatures 
Lewis met Abulafia, who was a great supporter and wanted to help rally Eurosceptics in 
academia in order to provide a historical perspective to the campaign for a looser 
relationship with the EU. Lewis agreed to help and this turned into Historians for Britain.137  
 
As Historians for Britain were the first historical actors to come forward in the Brexit debate, 
it is worthy of looking into how they were organised and how they viewed themselves. If one 
goes to the about section on former Historians for Britain website one would might come to 
the conclusion that Historians for Britain was a campaign group. The group was made up of 
a number of different historians from varying historical and political schools of thought, and 
as I will argue varying levels of support from its supporters138.  
In the email correspondence, I had with Abigail Green139 a former Historians for Britain 
supporter, she argued that Historians for Britain wasn’t a campaign group, and it is perhaps 
wrong to call them this. The reasons she gives for this are: that the original letter to the 
                                                          
135 https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/history-teaches-us-to-vote-no-to-av-087f5zb087q (Full letter 
and list of signatories.) retrieved 01/04/2018. 
136 Interview with Oliver Lewis, London, 02/02/2018. 
137 Email correspondence with Oliver Lewis, 18/09/2017.  
138 Abigail Green didn’t sign any further letters; however, she did not withdraw her name from 
Historians for Britain. 
139 Abigail Green, born 12/05/1971, British historian, Professor of Modern European history at 
Brasenose College, Oxford, former Historians for Britain supporter.  
45 
 
Times was essentially a call for renegotiation of the relationship between the EU taking into 
account especially the situation created by the Euro. At the time of the letters publication, 
southern Europe in particular Greece had major fiscal problems. Green goes on further to 
say, in the lead up to the referendum campaign, those associated with the group were 
consulted about what stance Historians for Britain should take with regard to the different 
branches of the Leave Campaign. It was at this point that, Abulafia informed Green that the 
balance of opinion was about 2/3 leave and 1/3 remain.140 Such a division on opinion would 
most likely make for an ineffective campaign group. Yet the word campaign comes up seven 
times in the short about section on the Historians for Britain web site. Moreover, statements 
such as: “dozens of Britain’s leading historians have already joined Historians for Britain 
campaign for a return of powers from the EU to the UK”141, give the impression that 
Historians for Britain was a campaign group.  
 
David Abulafia has a slightly different take as to what type of organisation Historians for 
Britain was. Abulafia stated that it was, “a think-tank holding private and public meetings and 
discussions, with panels of historians and public figures.”142 Perhaps this is a better 
description of Historians for Britain or at least their own understanding of themselves. It is 
arguably difficult to have a campaign group made up with people with different opinions on 
the issue the group is supposed to be campaigning about. As Green pointed out, the group 
was made up both of historians who wished to leave the EU and remain. Abulafia points out: 
  
Initially we included both those who were certain the UK should leave the EU and others 
who argued for radical reform of the EU, when it became clear that the terms offered by 
David Cameron were very disappointing some members nonetheless preferred to remain in 
the EU, but most decided they had no option but to leave.143  
 
Cameron like Harold Wilson in 1975, found it very difficult to get anything from the EU. While 
Cameron claimed to have secured a deal that gave Britain ‘special status’ in the 28-nation 
                                                          
140 Email correspondence with Abigail Green, 01/10/2017.  
141 Taken from former website of Historians for Britain. 
142 Email correspondence with David Abulafia, 17/10/2017.   
143 Ibid.  
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bloc, for sceptics this didn’t go far enough. The key issue for sceptics was the issue of 
national sovereignty, while Cameron did secure a commitment to exempt Britain from ‘ever 
closer union’, this, however, didn’t see a return of sovereignty to the Westminster 
parliament.144  
 
Oliver Lewis take on the organisational structure of Historians for Britain was that it was an 
advocacy group a kind of hybrid between a think-tank and a campaign group. In terms of 
how Historians for Britain saw themselves Lewis stated that, they were trying to inject an 
intellectual well-reasoned, well-sourced argument into the debate.145 Thus, giving some 
historical context to the Brexit debate.   
 
There are a number of reasons why I have included an overview of Historians for Britain and 
not Historians for Britain in Europe. Firstly, and most importantly, I received the most source 
material from former Historians for Britain. As well as the referendum going the way which 
the majority of their supporters had hoped, I decided it was worth giving an overview of what 
type of group they were, and how they saw themselves.   
 
3.3 Activities and arguments promoted by actor’s pre-
referendum   
 
 
Firstly, one may well ask the question why should historians be promoting activities and 
arguments in the Brexit debate. Shouldn’t they just teach history and write books and leave 
the debating, and informing of the public to politicians? In an interview on Irish radio, British 
journalist Peter Hitchens made a number of points which give weight to the argument 
historians should very much be involved. While discussing the ‘Irish question’, the Irish 
border been one of the most difficult issues in Brexit. “Hitchens argued, “during the long 
period when him and others had argued for a return to British sovereignty in vain, the 
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145 Interview with Oliver Lewis, London, 02/02/2018. 
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problem was so many journalists and politicians didn’t understand the European issue they 
didn’t know the history of it nor how it worked. Hitchens also stated that he recommended 
two books146, one making the Eurosceptic case and the other the pro-European one he sees 
them as essential guides to understanding the issue. Hitchens, was at times dismayed that 
so many in politics and journalism knew so little of the facts in these two books.”147  
 
If one takes a look at the government recommendations for history teaching one will see 
there is no mention of British and European integration.148 This is a little strange given that 
Britain’s relationship with Europe has dominated politics for the past 60 years. Oliver 
Daddow also comments on this too in, Euroscepticism and History education in Britain:  
 
the overly reverential attitude to recent history on the part of the British, and an almost total 
neglect of peacetime dimensions of modern European history since 1945, both serve to 
exaggerate the country to fall back on glib images as Britain as a great power.149  
 
Given this, surely it is of upmost importance for historians to respond to the debate, make 
arguments and in general play an active role. After all, as E.H. Carr once said, “The function 
of the historian is neither to love the past nor to emancipate himself from the past, but to 
master and understand it as the key to understanding of the present.”150 According to Carr, 
historians have a role to play in the present and it is key they offer insights so that we can 
better understand the present.  
 
                                                          
146 Books Hitchens recommended to understand the European issue: Hugo Young, This blessed plot, 
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147 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YEBhETERbRk full interview available here. (retrieved 
6/12/2017). 
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3.3.1 Historians for Britain: Response, Activities and Arguments  
 
The Eurosceptic arguments put forward by Historians for Britain stirred up some controversy 
amongst academics. Their arguments showed that there would be no united view from the 
academic community in the Brexit debate. A small number of academics, preferred Britain to 
leave, a much larger number preferred Britain to remain but the vast majority remained 
silent. Those that remained silent may well have had their views, they simply choose not to 
express them publically. Oliver Lewis pointed out that, “a number of historians stated they 
agreed with Historians for Britain’s arguments and were sceptical of the European project, 
they chose, however, to remain out of the political side of things and didn’t put their names 
forward in support of Historians for Britain.”151  
 
A Guardian article published after the referendum gives some indication as to why some 
may have chosen to remain silent. The articles title is, ‘I voted for Brexit – why do academic 
colleagues treat me like a pariah.’ The author is anonymous the series itself in the Guardian 
is called anonymous academics. A notable quote in the article is, “I never raise the matter, 
but it quickly becomes apparent that I disagree with the prevailing view (at least in the arts 
and humanities) that Britain’s withdrawal from the EU is and epic act of foolishness.”152 The 
author also points that he/she worry about their prospects being harmed by admitting voting 
for Brexit. Perhaps this is part of the reason that so many academics remained silent or if 
they spoke out it was on the pro-European side. Moreover, it may well be a reason as to why 
Historians for Britain numbers in terms of supporters were so much lower than the pro-
European side. I do, however, treat the Guardian article with a degree of scepticism. It is 
difficult to check any of the claims made as the author has remained anonymous.     
 
In light of this political climate in the United Kingdom and its universities how did Historians 
for Britain and others respond to the Brexit debate, and would they take part in any activities 
and promote arguments? The short answer here is yes, they certainly responded to the 
debate, they also took part in a number of activities, for example, seminars, radio interviews 
and TV appearances. In terms of arguments promoted: a simplistic answer would be to say 
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they made a patriotic historical case for a radical new relationship between Britain and the 
EU. Sonderweg could be applied to the arguments Historians for Britain made as they 
argued that British history had followed a sort of special path.  However, this is too simplistic 
an answer and a more thorough discourse analysis is necessary if one is to fully understand 
the arguments that were made. 
  
Historians for Britain deployed a number of arguments in response to the Brexit debate. 
Someone who is familiar with British Eurosceptic arguments would also be familiar with the 
arguments Historians for Britain made. For instance, Peter Hitchens has argued that, “the 
EU’s expansionism has brought war to Yugoslavia and Ukraine, and may yet cause more 
violence.”153 Historians for Britain also go into this argument, going against the belief that the 
EU has kept peace in Europe. Yet, Europe has enjoyed the longest period of peace since 
the formation of the EU. While it isn’t this Historians for Britain argue against they argue that 
it is not the EU who has kept the peace but NATO. The failure of the EU to act in the former 
Yugoslavia is given as an example as the EUs failure to keep peace. 
 
Historians for Britain’s Nigel Jones154 used his column in the Daily Telegraph (a British daily 
newspaper) to argue that it was NATO that had kept peace in Europe. In May 2016, Prime 
Minister Cameron made a speech in the British Museum where he argued that it was the EU 
who had preserved peace in Europe. A British exit would make it more likely that the 
continent would plunge into a reprise of The Two World Wars, this argued Jones was a 
classic example of the Orwellian big lie. An Orwellian big lie was the idea that if you are 
going to tell a lie, make it a big one, and if possible make it the exact opposite of the truth.155 
Clearly, Jones is in complete disagreement with what Cameron had argued in his speech.  
 
Jones made a number of arguments in his article to show why he was in complete 
disagreement. Firstly, Jones argued that, the EU has already worsened – if it did not directly 
                                                          
153 Peter Hitchens, "An Archbishop Preaching Pure Nonsense " The Mail on Sunday, 10/06/2018. 
154 Nigel Jones, born 1951, British historian, journalist and biographer, former Historians for Britain 
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cause – two armed conflicts on European soil in the former Yugoslavia and Ukraine. Jones 
argued that EU meddling stretched into Ukraine causing it to split into two. He also stated, 
that the failure of EU diplomacy helped speed Yugoslavia into a brutal civil war. In the end, a 
fragile peace was secured not by the EU, but by NATO bombs and arms twisting backed by 
the alliance’s military muscle.156 Yet in 2012, the EU won the Nobel peace prize. The Nobel 
committee applauded the EU for its, “contribution over the past 60 years, ‘to the 
advancement of peace and reconciliation, democracy and human rights in Europe’ and 
being instrumental in ‘transforming most of Europe from a continent of war to one of 
peace’.”157 Clearly, there are a number of arguments both for the fact it was NATO which 
has kept peace in Europe, and that it was the EU which has kept peace. As the arguments 
involve history to some degree, it comes as no surprise that historians invoked these 
arguments when making their cases. Those in favour of EU membership argued that, Britain 
could only face up to modern conflicts in an alliance with her European neighbours. On the 
other hand, those who were Eurosceptic argued that the EU had even went as far to worsen 
or cause some conflicts  
 
I suspect when the historians were putting pen to paper for Historians for Britain, Greece 
was experiencing major fiscal problems. This was used as an argument to show why Britain 
was right not to join the Euro. As well as being right to shun closer European integration as 
doing so could potentially ruin Britain’s economy, or mean Britain must come to the help of 
other European neighbours. More integration would also lead to loss of British sovereignty, 
something Eurosceptics have argued against for many years. The fact that many of laws 
have been made in Brussels and not in Britain has caused Eurosceptics great pain. 
Historians for Britain addressed this from a historical standpoint, arguing that Britain has 
always engaged with Europe, however, from a very different position from that of today. This 
is a particular example of where the idea of an English Sonderweg comes in. Historians for 
Britain and others who are Eurosceptic, see British institutions such as Parliament as 
ancient, unique and their preservation as of the upmost importance. Such long-standing 
institutions set English history apart from the rest of Europe. Any move towards as what they 
see as giving away sovereignty to the EU is wrong.              
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Two of Historians for Britain’s essays which seemed to be in line with two of the most 
debated issues the run-up to the referendum were: Gwythian Prins158 Britain’s EU 
membership potentially eroding her global influence, and Oliver Lewis’s Harold Wilson’s 
1975 renegotiations with the EEC. For the British Eurosceptics, Britain as a global trader not 
shackled by EU rules has been a longstanding dream. They believe Britain would be more 
successful outside of the EU as a free trading nation with the rest of the world. As for 
Wilson’s 1975 renegotiations it was thought by many not just Eurosceptics that what Wilson 
got from the EEC didn’t go far enough. It could be that this essay was produced with the 
hope that David Cameron would succeed in getting a better deal than Harold Wilson did. 
Historians for Britain had hoped for a deal which reflected Britain’s unique history, as well as 
hopefully bringing about a much looser relationship with the EU. 
 
The above paragraphs are a description of some of arguments promoted by Historians for 
Britain. The arguments promoted reflect a common theme from British Eurosceptics. 
Sovereignty is a key word they use in their cause. The idea of Britain making its own laws, 
without interference and hindrance from the EU is something which has always been of 
upmost importance to the Eurosceptics. Sovereignty is a word heard less frequently in other 
EU member states, yet in Britain it has galvanised a whole generation of Eurosceptics.159 
This argument has always been there in Britain right from the early days of European 
integration up to today. What is new is, a group of historians coming together in this way, 
and publically promoting these arguments, via their expertise in history, to make the case for 
a return of sovereignty to Britain.  
 
Historians for Britain supporters wrote a number of different essays which were published in 
blog format on the Historians for Britain website. These blogs, by in large were quite 
sceptical of the European project and discussed European history with a Eurosceptic tone. 
Their target audience was the general public160, would members of the public actually take 
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any interest in a group of historians writing Eurosceptic essays? In short, the main point with 
the blogs is they offered something different to the Brexit debate. The arguments and 
narrative in them isn’t something which was offered by the more populist UKIP type, they 
tended to use scare monger tactics on immigrant numbers. While one may well have 
disagreed with Historians for Britain, it is difficult to argue that they didn’t offer something 
very different to the Brexit debate. This view is also shared by A.W. Purdue, a Historians for 
Britain supporter and author of one of the essays. Purdue argues that, “the group prided 
itself on taking a rational and analytical view as opposed to the more UKIPish and emotional 
view.”161  
 
It isn’t possible to gauge whether the blogs actually swayed the British public to vote in a 
particular direction. But it is possible to say the Historians for Britain offered something to the 
debate via these blogs and other articles, as well as TV and radio appearances. 
Furthermore, it gave historians a platform to use their profession and to offer arguments to 
the debate. The Brexit referendum is one of the most important events in recent British 
history, it is also one where historical context in the debate was very important. One could 
argue, that it was a once in a lifetime chance for some historians to present their views and 
arguments to the public on the issue. 
 
 
I have found a total of 18 different essays which were made available to the public via the 
Historians for Britain website. A number of their supporters put pen to paper and wrote these 
essays.162 The essays were published between 2013 and 2016.  I will now go deeper into 
the Oliver Lewis essay Lessons from the 1975 EU renegotiation and discuss some of the 
points he makes. Firstly, David Abulafia contributes with the foreword. In this he praises 
Lewis’s work calling it, “a fascinating account and both a well-researched piece of history 
and an essay that makes one sit up and think on Britain’s current discussions on the EU.”163 
Abulafia makes some arguments which he would use again, “calling the ‘European project’ a 
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vague one as it doesn’t allow for states (of which the UK isn’t the only one) to value their 
own distinctive identity.”164 Here is one of the main arguments of Historians for Britain, it is, 
however, not an exclusive argument to Historians for Britain nor is it a new argument. Given 
that, British sovereignty has gradually eroded over the years particularly after Maastricht, it 
comes as no surprise that Historians for Britain and others continue to argue that British 
history has followed a special path, and has a distinctive identity which should be valued.   
 
Lewis used a wide variety of sources including both primary and secondary as well as 
interviews with some of the key players. The text comes forward as academic in the sense 
of being well referenced and documented. At the same time, it is also accessible to the 
general public in terms of deploying a language accessible to non-experts. I would also add 
that this essay is an example of a historian’s response to the Brexit debate. Business for 
Britain, had a year’s long freedom of information battle to secure some documents from the 
Foreign Office, which Lewis has made use of in this essay.165 By doing this Lewis was able 
to add substance to the common view from historians that Wilson achieved nothing but 
some cosmetic changes from the renegotiation ‘s with the European community, mainly 
changes to agricultural trade. 
 
It is often, although, not always the work of the historian to uncover documents which may 
reveal something which isn’t already known about the past. This essay is an example of 
Historians for Britain doing that work. The following quotes are examples of what the 
previously unreleased documents reveal about Wilson’s renegotiations “Among officials it 
was – and still is – referred to as a ‘so–called renegotiation’.”166 “Proposals that would 
require Treaty change were amended.”167 Treaty change would have meant more radical 
changes, in particular British sovereignty may not have been eroded has much as it has 
been. This work by Lewis and Business for Britain, was picked up by the national media in 
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the UK. The Telegraph published an article where it was highlighted that, the minutes were 
released under a freedom of information act as their initial request was refused by the 
Foreign Office, saying the release “would prejudice the interest of the UK abroad. The 
decision was overruled by the Information Commissioner.”168 Robert Oxley, the campaign 
director of Business for Britain was also quoted in the article, “’forty years ago, the public 
were denied the benefits of a genuine renegotiation by those who were determined that our 
future lay in the European Community regardless.’”169 Historians for Britain were determined 
that this wouldn’t be the case in the Brexit referendum.    
 
Another point of significance is Dominic Sandbrook, a British historian, columnist and TV 
presenter also discussed the lessons and similarities between Wilson’s and Cameron’s 
attempted negotiations. With all due respect to Oliver Lewis, Sandbrook is much better-
known historian, he has presented a number of historical documentaries for the BBC. 
Sandbrook used his column in the socially Conservative British newspaper the Daily Mail to 
highlight some of the similarities between Wilson and Cameron, as well as their positions 
with European relations. He like Lewis was hopeful Cameron could avoid a Wilson type 
scenario where very little is achieved in negotiations, “with Britain facing an economic crisis 
and turmoil abroad the last thing we need is a second Harold Wilson.”170 This view was 
shared by Business for Britain they argued that,  “Britain should learn lessons from the past 
so that it is able to seek a genuinely improved deal from the EU today and that people are 
given a fair and informed choice in any EU referendum.”171  Both pieces which I have briefly 
discussed here are a response to the Brexit debate. The platforms they used were very 
different, but they were both examples of a historical response. As historian G.R. Elton once 
argued, “history is not the study of the past, but the study of present traces of the past.”172 
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Lewis and Sandbrook have followed what Elton argued in his famous book The Practice of 
history when responding to the Brexit debate.   
 
3.4 Other historian’s responses to the Brexit debate 
 
So far, I have discussed how Historians for Britain responded to the Brexit debate. In the 
following sections, I will discuss some of the responses of other historians who were 
affiliated to groups with very different views than those of Historians for Britain. Two 
examples of other groups which offered arguments to the Brexit debate are: Academics for 
Britain in Europe the historians who were supporters came under the section Historians for 
Britain in Europe and Historians for History. The narrative and analysis on these pages is 
very different from that on the pages of Historians for Britain. Another important point is 
Historians for Britain in Europe had the support of 380 historians that’s a little over 8 times 
as many as Historians for Britain. This shows that, the view amongst historians who involved 
themselves publically in the Brexit debate was predominately a pro-European one. 
 
In terms of the narrative of Historians for Britain in Europe, it would appear to be a similar 
one as the official Remain Campaign used in the Brexit referendum campaign. The 
historians who included well-known names such as: Richard Overy, Mary Beard173 and at 
this stage pre- Brexit, Niall Ferguson, accepted that Britain does have a past, they also 
argued that the EU is not perfect. In this they are in agreement with Historians for Britain. 
But their arguments after this become very different. They believed it was best that Britain 
remained part of the EU. The reasoning for this is that Britain would be in a better position to 
reform the EU, and in a stronger position as part of the EU to assert global influence. 
Historians for Britain in Europe published research form 2015 up until the referendum. Prime 
Minister Cameron, and many others on the remain side made similar arguments throughout 
the referendum campaign. But how did these 380 historians articulate the historical case for 
Britain to remain part of the EU? 
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The website of Historians for Britain in Europe contains a number of statements and articles 
written by some of its supporters; as well as this it also has links to newspaper articles and 
blogs by supporters and other like-minded individuals. This is different from Historians for 
Britain website; the longer essays aren’t a part of Historians for Britain in Europe’s content. 
Nonetheless, they still try to make a patriotic case for Britain to stay in Europe.  
 
Richard Overy argued in a statement that: 
  
British soldiers hadn’t only fought to defend Britain in the two World Wars, but so that all 
Europeans should share the prospects of economic security, an end to tyranny and a 
common democratic culture.174 
 
It is this idea of shared history and identity which comes through as the narrative on this 
website. Keith Thomas historian of early modern England argues:  
 
the British Isles have always been part of a larger European entity, they have been ruled by 
the Romans, Danes, Frenchman, a Dutchman, and German Electors, later kings, of 
Hanover.175  
 
Towards the end of the article Thomas also summed up by saying, “the historian can only 
marvel at what an astonishing phenomenon the European Union has been.”176 Overy sums 
up his piece with, “while not perfect the European Union, is preferable to the way Europe 
looked for much of the last century.”177 These are very different arguments than those 
offered by Historians for Britain. I will discuss these two very different articles from the 
opposing camps, in which both groups deployed arguments to the Brexit debate, as well as 
injecting a degree of historical context.  
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Neil Gregor178 made some notable contributions to the historical debate on Brexit. Gregor 
welcomed Historians for Britain to the debate, while questioning their perspective of things. 
Gregor questioned Historians for Britain’s version of Britain’s past in May 2015, this is a 
month which seen a number of notable exchanges between historians in the media.  
 
In a blog post, in the Huffington Post an American blog and opinion based website179, 
Gregor responded directly to Historians for Britain’s letter to the Times, the creation of their 
website and David Abulafia’s letter to the History Today magazine. Abulafia had wrote on 
behalf of Historians for Britain in his letter making the case for the need for such a group as 
Historians for Britain. In the first paragraph of his blog post, Gregor is keen to stress that, “it 
was a Conservative Prime Minister who took Britain into Europe, signed the Single 
European act180 (Margaret Thatcher) and signed the Treaty of Maastricht (John Major).”181 
Thus, providing context for wide ranging discussions on British membership of the EU. 
Gregor argued, it will surely be necessary for historians to remind people of these facts as 
there is a danger that the debate could go off into mythologies. Gregor states that, it is the 
job of the historian to provide sober objective facts. Gregor argued that: 
 
the formation of the pressure group ‘Historians for Britain’, shows only too well, many of 
these mythologies that will circulate over the coming time will be penned by historians 
themselves.182  
 
Gregor goes on to challenge some of the arguments which had been made by Historians for 
Britain in the rest of his blog piece. He pointed out that the list of Britain’s ‘leading’ historians 
who were supporters Historians for Britain was actually quite thin. He also points out that 
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there were only one or two historians of modern European history. It is unsurprising, given 
that, British and European integration mainly come under modern European history that 
Gregor choose to point this out. I asked Oliver Lewis his thoughts on having modern 
European historians as supporters as Historians for Britain. He pointed out that, the two 
main criteria Historians for Britain had was quality and historians people knew about. As I 
previously discussed, having David Starkey and David Abulafia on board was an indication 
that they had achieved this. There was a hope for a more even balance of right and left 
historians as well as a more gender balanced group. Ultimately, this wasn’t achieved just 6 
of the 45 supporters were women. Lewis was keen to stress that this wasn’t for lack of 
trying.183 This lack of historians of modern Europe amongst Historians for Britain’s 
supporters gave their opponents ammunition to denounce their arguments.  
 
Gregor challenges Historians for Britain analysis on a number of occasions in his blog post. 
For instance, Gregor points out that in Britain, universal male suffrage was introduced in 20th 
century Britain and women only got the vote in 1928. It is, however, worth noting that as 
early as 1848 Disraeli had said in the Commons, “if a woman could be head of a state and a 
landowner she could certainly exercise the vote.”184 I quote the famous Victorian politician 
here, as it is worthy of note that votes for women was something which was discussed in 
Britain long before they were introduced. The action proved much more difficult in a large 
state such as Britain with many smaller states introducing universal suffrage earlier.  
 
Gregor thinks it is doubtless that the great authoritarian ‘other’ in Historians for Britain 
arguments was Germany. This, according to Gregor, is a little complicated given that, 
universal male suffrage was introduced in Germany in 1871 and votes for women 
immediately after the First World War.185 Here it seems, what Gregor is trying to get at that 
is, Britain’s history wasn’t so unique and special. He also uses the example of imperialism to 
illustrate this point. “Imperialism hardly leaves British history as one which is exceptional. 
Exportation, slavery, massacres, expulsions, oppression anyone?”186 Again, Gregor is 
making arguments which counter Historians for Britain’s. Gregor’s summing up of his article 
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is rather different, “any undergraduate can tell you there is something unique about the 
longevity of Britain’s parliamentary institutions, and right at the end dismissing, what he 
labels as Historians for Britain’s manifesto (the letter in history today) as nonsense.”187 Here 
Gregor goes from offering counter arguments, to dismissing Historians for Britain’s 
arguments as nonsense.   
 
How should one interpret Neil Gregor’s blog post Historians, Britain and Europe? His blog 
shows, is that it is indeed possible for an academic to make many valid responses to other 
academic’s arguments. I would also argue that in the case of the Brexit debate this was of 
upmost importance, that there wasn’t a united view in academia, that academics could offer 
differing arguments to the public. As I have already pointed out, knowledge of modern 
European history is lacking on British school’s curriculums and even amongst its political 
classes. At this important stage, one year prior to the referendum, some of the public may 
well have welcomed historical context. Moreover, some may have thought it necessary to 
have some understanding on the history of British and European relations before they 
decided how to vote.   
 
But what was Gregor actually offering counter arguments too? The letter published in History 
Today described by Gregor as a ‘manifesto’ is also worthy of discussion. The title of the 
letter is, Britain: apart from or a part of Europe? Written by David Abulafia, it was published 
in History Today on 11th May 2015. The sub title is; The ‘Historians for Britain’ campaign 
believes that Britain’s unique history sets it apart from the rest of Europe. From this alone it 
is easy to see why Gregor choose to question Historians for Britain so much and I argue 
such questioning in a debate should be welcome. Abulafia was keen to stress, “that 
Historians for Britain aren’t hostile to Europe, at this stage they believed that in an ideal 
world Britain should remain in a reformed EU.”188 Abulafia also makes the case for historical 
perspectives on Britain’s relationship with Europe, saying that, “the debate about that 
relationship has not just become lively but heated.”189 Abulafia argues that, “the British 
political temper has been milder than that in larger European countries.”190 English 
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philosopher Roger Scruton who is known for his Conservative views has also made similar 
augments on the British political temper: 
 
common sense and comprise were the norms of English politics. Therefore, it is unsurprising 
that it is over 300 years since the last violent change in form of government in England. Only 
Denmark has a longer peaceful record.191 
 
This quote from Scruton is evidence that Historian’s for Britain’s arguments aren’t confined 
to the historical profession.  
 
In his final paragraph Abulafia states that Historians for Britain aims to facilitate the debate. 
He goes further to say, “the offer from the EU for a new relationship must reflect the 
distinctive character of the United Kingdom, rooted in its largely uninterrupted history since 
the middle ages.”192 Obviously, such statements are going to create a debate not just from 
other historians but amongst some of the public too. After all, the letter was published in a 
monthly history magazine. Perhaps that was Abulafia’s intention, to create a debate 
amongst his colleagues and maybe amongst the British public. Such a debate amongst 
historians was picked up by other media outlets. Furthermore, both groups of historians got 
a national platform via a number of newspaper and magazine articles, and in some cases 
TV and radio appearances, as a consequence of these public disagreements.   
 
3.4.1 Historians for history and other responses  
 
Historians for history was originally set up in 2015 by historians: Edward Madigan the public 
historian from the Royal Holloway University of London and Graham Smith the oral historian 
also from the Royal Holloway. Their initial aim was to respond to the promotion of what they 
felt was a distorted, politically driven narrative of Britain’s historical relationship with 
continental Europe by Historians for Britain and some others. Their website and blog 
became a discussion place on Britain’s place in Europe and the wider world. Their website 
contains quite a few links to what is best described as articles by historians who had given a 
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pro-European response to the debate, and in particular a response to David Abulafia’s letter 
which I discussed in the previous section. 
 
One of the articles which is linked to is the open letter by a group of historians in response to 
Abulafia’s letter in History Today. Fog in the Channel, Historians isolated was published 
shortly after Abulafia’s letter. Here the pro-European historians made their case for Britain’s 
place in Europe and against Historians for Britain. The article was also linked to on the 
Historians for Britain in Europe website. It was also signed by a much larger number than 
the Historians for Britain ever managed to get signatures for. The article is worthy of further 
analysis, which I will do in the following paragraphs.  
 
In the beginning of the letter the historians193 point out that Abulafia’s claim that, “Britain is 
exceptional when compared to the rest of Europe is nothing new. It dominated scholarship in 
the 19th and 20th centuries, but has been overhauled in recent decades.”194 Although 
according to Daddow this has proved difficult, “pro-Europeans have found it difficult to inject 
a badly needed shot of uncertainty into the stories the British tell themselves about the 
past.”195 The historians who penned the counter letter, “welcome Abulafia’s invitation to the 
debate, but say they are unconvinced by the prospective provided.”196 Why are the 
historians who penned the counter letter unconvinced by Historians for Britain? They argue 
that Historians for Britain’s arguments aren’t anything new. Furthermore, they go further to 
say, “this version of Britain’s past does not fit with evidence encountered in their own 
research, and the approach doesn’t provoke debate it gives a foregone conclusion.”197  
 
The historians take issue with Abulafia’s statement that: 
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Britain’s ‘ancient institutions’ have experienced a degree of continuity unparalleled in 
continental Europe. Such continuity would indeed be spectacular, but it is illusory. Britain’s 
past is neither so exalted or unique.198 
 
These arguments are in clear disagreement to Abulafia’s, but what reasons do the historians 
give for such a response? For parliamentary sovereignty, they argue this wasn’t achieved 
until the 17th century. And this was only after very bloody revolutions in Scotland, Ireland and 
England. This leads the historians to question Britain’s ‘uninterrupted’ connection to the 
medieval past which Abulafia had argued. Furthermore, this didn’t lead to greater democracy 
with universal suffrage not coming until 1928, this was later than Germany. Another point 
Abulafia had made was the British Common Law system was unique too. The historians who 
composed the letter counter argue by saying that this wasn’t actually British it was English. 
While it is indeed peculiar it isn’t the only such system in Europe. In addition to this, British 
law has always been influenced in practice by European legal codes, long before the 
European convention on human rights.199  
 
The next issue the historians take up is something which is a very complex and a much-
debated area of history. It is important to stress, on such issues, emotional responses can 
be trigged, historians like anyone else aren’t immune to this. Abulafia had argued that anti-
Semitism did not root as deeply in Britain as it did in Europe. The counter arguments by the 
historians who drafted the response is that, it nevertheless has a long history here. 12th 
century Britain, witnessed accusations of ritual murder against Jews. King Edward I also 
expelled Jews from his kingdom although not the only king to do this.200 In short, Britain also 
has a dark past. They go further to argue that, “a raft of negative literary portrayals has 
become part of British culture, from Shakespeare and Dickens, and the Marconi scandal201, 




201 The degree of anti-Semitism in the British political Marconi scandal is still disputed. This 
happened only a few years after the Dreyfus affair in France which remains one of the most notable 
examples of a miscarriage of justice and anti-Semitism. Reading closely, it would appear that the 
historians are saying that the Marconi scandal wasn’t ‘as bad’ as the Dreyfus affair but pointing out 
that Britain does indeed have this dark tradition.   
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only a few years after the Dreyfus affair.”202 Here the historians enter a very complex area of 
history. Few would disagree that Britain too has a dark past, however, debating the degree 
of anti-Semitism seen in Britain to that seen in Europe is very complex, difficult and emotive.     
 
The historians writing this article seem to be challenging the traditional ‘Whig’ interpretation 
of British history. To define ‘Whig’ history it is worth briefly looking at how historian G.M. 
Trevelyan approached his work. According to Richard Evans, the Trevelyan’s203 regarded 
English history, “as a progress towards liberty and democracy, fought for by men like 
themselves, against the entrenched forces of conservatism, authoritarianism, hierarchy and 
tradition.”204 I would argue that Historians for Britain, have also approached their work in the 
‘Whig’ tradition. Moreover, I suspect they would have seen Britain getting ‘a better deal’ from 
the EU or leaving altogether as progress towards liberty and democracy. Like the 
Trevelyan’s, fought for by men (Historians for Britain were mainly men) like themselves. 
Such historiography sets English history and, indeed, British history as a history which has 
followed ‘a special path’ and as exceptional. Historians of ‘Whig’ persuasion would, I would 
argue, see anti-Semitism as not having struck as deeply in Britain, and in seeing the British 
political temper as milder than its European neighbours. As they see it British history has 
followed ‘a special path’ and avoided some of the horrors seen in Europe. This 
historiography has been questioned, particularly in recent years. The authors of the counter 
response do this, particularly on the issue of anti-Semitism, and on what ‘Whigs’ would see 
as Britain’s unique institutions.  
  
3.5 Concluding remarks  
 
Historians from various political schools of thought didn’t hold back from letting the public 
know their views. They made various arguments and points in the Brexit debate, often by 
invoking the past. They also argued publically amongst each other. Responding to each 
other’s blog posts, magazine and newspaper articles. At times the debate was lively, at 
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times it became hostile. Some very distinct groups of historians emerged: on the Eurosceptic 
side Historians for Britain made the case usually by arguing that British history was unique 
and had followed ‘a special path’. On the pro-European side Historians for Britain in Europe 
were the main standard bearers. Other smaller pro-European groups emerged such as 
Historians for History also emerged. They argued that British history was only understood 
via that of a constant interaction with its European neighbours and wasn’t so unique and 
special. While all groups attracted supporters, it is important to remember that the vast 
majority of British historians didn’t attach themselves to any group. British people hadn’t had 
a say on EU membership since 1975, it is fair to say this was a once in a generation 
opportunity. For some historians, it was also a once in a generation opportunity to make their 
case. While it would seem likely that some of Historians for Britain’s supporters and those of 
other groups would have held their views for much of their careers. The majority of them 
wouldn’t have had a chance to get so involved publically, or been given the media platforms 





Chapter 4: Brexit 2015-2017 
 
4.1 Introduction  
 
 
The following chapter, will look at how the discourse in the Brexit debate, particularly from 
historians, developed between 2015-2017. The debate was often hostile and not just 
amongst politicians, the British public also argued amongst themselves as did historians. 
Such a polarised debate meant that historians were called upon to provide historical context. 
Via a number of media platforms various historians offered their arguments and versions of 
Britain’s past.  
 
4.2 Historians and Brexit 
 
The common view of British historians in the first part of the 20th century, “was that history 
had to be neutral as well as objective, and that taking sides was unscientific and set a bad 
example to students.”205 In a daily politics clip for the BBC aired on 12th March 2015, David 
Abulafia argued that Historians for Britain wasn’t trying to impose a view, they were 
attempting to provide a long perspective. This would indeed fit in with earlier 20th century 
historians, however, as time went by historians took sides in the Brexit debate. In the same 
program, Mary Beard stated that she liked the idea of academics getting involved in politics, 
she did stress that people didn’t have to agree with them. Beard used her expertise on the 
ancient Roman empire throughout the debate. She argued in this clip, that Ancient Rome 
was a superstrate were citizens enjoyed basic rights from Scotland to the Sahara.206   
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Although at this point (March 2015), the referendum date nor the legality of it were set in 
stone, it was well-known that there would probably be a referendum at some point. Beard 
and Abulafia and other historians with varying views had already began to make their voices 
and views known before any date was set. It wasn’t until 27th May 2015 that the European 
Union referendum bill was unveiled in the Queens speech, this piece of legislation would 
allow the referendum to take place. On the 20th February 2016, Cameron announced that 
the referendum would take place on 23rd June 2016. Cameron, having returned from 
Brussels without everything he wanted from his renegotiations with EU, began making the 
case for Britain to remain. As I have already discussed Historians for Britain had already 
began to do what Abulafia called offering a long perspective. They would continue to do this, 
whist others such as Beard would offer very differing long perspectives to the debate. 
 
4.3 Increase in discourse from historians  
 
Historians for Britain had already been to the press prior to the Conservative election victory 
in 2015. It was as early as 2013 that Historians for Britain went to the press calling for what 
they called ‘a better deal’ with the EU. After Cameron called an election the debate between 
historians began to increase in the: media, on blogs, on TV and on radio. Historians for 
Britain were joined by other supporters in addition to those who had already signed the letter 
to the Times in 2013. 
 
In sub-chapter 3.4.1 I discussed the Historians for Britain letter written by David Abulafia 
making the case for Historians for Britain, alongside a letter drafted a week later by a much 
larger group of historians questioning Historians for Britain’s narrative and making a 
passionate pro-European case. Historians for Britain’s letter was published less than one 
week after the Conservative election victory, with the counter letter coming one week later 
on 18th May 2015. It is at this point that two very distinctive groups of historians became 
involved in the debate.  
 
Historians for Britain were out much earlier than the pro-European historians, it wasn’t until 
the Tory election victory that remain historians really kicked into gear. Why was this the 
case? Oliver Lewis made a number of points to me on this when I interviewed him. Having 
suspected that an EU referendum may well have being coming in 2013, Lewis, having 
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feared that the majority of business would be seen as wanting to remain thought the 
nightmare scenario would be if academia was also seen as wanting to stay. Lewis was 
working as research director at Business for Britain at the time. He thought the obvious 
people to target in academia were historians. His reasons for this were: first, that historians 
are proper academics who understand the history of the UK and its relationship with Europe. 
As well as a real politic argument that it would show that highly educated people were split 
on the issue of Britain’s place in Europe.207  
 
The reason for Historians for Britain coming together earlier than other groups of historians 
who involved themselves in the debate, is that it was very much feared that academia would 
almost all want to remain. Therefore, it was seen as necessary for those who were sceptical 
of the European project to come together early. It was suspected that they would be in the 
minority and would have less resources to call upon. The early start would, they hoped, ease 
these disadvantages.  This debate between historians would continue right up until 
referendum day and continue on after the referendum. 
 
The later start of Historians for Britain in Europe is something Andrew Knapp came to regret 
when he reflected on their campaign. Knapp disliked the idea that Historians for Britain could 
claim a monopoly on being ‘for Britain’. He argued that this was a small right-wing group, 
sharing its Westminster address with (among others) the Thatcherite Centre for Policy 
Studies. By the time Knapp began to gather supporters Historians for Britain had already 
created a website which was well located on the search engines. This pushed Historians for 
Britain in Europe to create their own website. It should be brighter than Historians for 
Britain’s, which Knapp described as well-designed but as gloomy as an Oxford Autumn.  
 
It was on their website that Historians for Britain in Europe continued to offer their 
arguments. A longer version of their letter to the Times acted as their common statement, as 
well as individual statements and links to articles. Knapp points out that they didn’t have the 
money that their opponents had, perhaps the fact that Historians for Britain were part of 
Business for Britain meant that they could draw on greater resources.208 Nonetheless, 
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Historians for Britain in Europe were able to offer their arguments which were picked up in 
the media. Some of them were even invited to Downing Street by the Chancellor George 
Osbourne209. The fact they were given a platform by those which held the highest office in 
the land is arguably goes some way to make up for the lack of resources Historians for 
Britain in Europe had. Moreover, Historians for Britain were never invited into Downing 
Street, their arguments were very different to those of the majority of the British ruling class 
prior to the referendum.  
 
4.4 Media reaction to the historical debate 
 
Historians debating amongst themselves in the run up to one of the most important votes in 
British history didn’t go unnoticed in the media. Various newspaper and magazine articles 
were published, and some historians appeared on TV and radio. Historians began to be 
more than historians, they filled other roles too such as political commentators. Whilst the 
use of history often remained important in terms of how they formulated their arguments, 
they went beyond the traditional role of the historian and involved themselves in politics. The 
media reacted to this, in the following sub-sections I will discuss these reactions and the 
coverage in the media. 
 
4.4.1 Newspapers take sides 
 
Not long after the two differing letters were published in History Today, the Guardian ran an 
editorial on the historical debate, Oliver Lewis described the article as, “a hit job on David 
Abulafia.”210 The title of the article is, the Guardian view on Britain and Europe: never a place 
apart. The Guardian openly backed remain throughout the debate, it is unsurprising that 
Historians for Britain and Abulafia’s arguments weren’t very well received in this newspaper. 
“Culture wars may be critical in the European referendum campaign. Historians are in the 
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front line.”211  It seems from the sub-title in the article that the Guardian view is that 
historians are very important in the upcoming campaign. I will discuss some of the points the 
article makes in the following paragraphs. 
 
The article was published on 22nd May 2015, and straight away the author states that the EU 
referendum will dominate politics for the immediate future. I doubt anyone would have 
argued with this, even at this early stage in developments (soon after the Tory election 
victory) it was clear what would dominate politics, and this was acknowledged in the media. 
The article also points out that both pro-European groups, for example, the CBI 
(confederation of British industry), as well as more sceptical voices, such as, Business for 
Britain, had already began to make their cases. 
 
The author of the article expresses belief that, “voters will be more concerned with what 
Britain’s place in Europe should be than with what David Cameron would achieve in his 
negotiations.”212 It was also pointed out that in the Scottish independence referendum, the 
culture wars could matter as much as the political and economic ones. The editorial states 
that, the first spin-off of this is a group of historians that had designated themselves as 
Historians for Britain. Indeed, it was the case that Historians for Britain were out of the 
starting blocks much earlier than their pro-European counterparts.  
 
One of the key statements in the article is, “ever since the discipline was invented, history 
has been a tool with which to forge identity.”213 In terms of Eurosceptic historical opinion the 
first consideration of the Common Market is highlighted as the beginning of this strand of 
historical opinion. While to point out that history has been used as tool to forge identity is, 
indeed, true, “it is important not just to invoke the past; there must be a belief that getting the 
story right matters.”214 British historian John Tosh used this argument when discussing 
Germany under the Third Reich, while the Nazi regime understood the power of the past by 
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blaming the Jews for all disasters in German history, one must surely question their 
historical awareness. the Guardian editorial goes on to question the historical awareness of 
Abulafia, with particular reference to his History Today letter published earlier in the same 
month.    
 
The Guardian editorial paraphrases some of Abulafia arguments in his History Today letter 
titled, Britain: apart from or a part of Europe. Saying that the Abulafia had: 
 
dusted off the old interpretation of Britain’s historical development as an island apart, 
blessed by institutions that evolved in a single uninterrupted sweep and endowed with a 
judge-made Common Law, distinct from the civil codes of other European nations.215  
 
The first issue with this is the editorial claim that Abulafia has ‘dusted off’ this old 
interpretation of history. John Tosh argues that this version of Britain’s past has remained, 
“the general theme of progress towards a pinnacle in the present day remained very 
popular.”216 Therefore, the argument that Abulafia has ‘dusted off’ this version of British 
history doesn’t hold much weight.  
 
The editorial takes issue with two of the more complex and controversial issues in the 
Abulafia piece. Abulafia argued that, “the British political temper has been milder than that in 
larger European countries.”217 Perhaps Abulafia’s intention was to argue that Britain had 
avoided such major upheavals than those seen in the French Revolution and in Nazi 
Germany. As early as 1790, politician and writer Edmund Burke pointed out in Reflections 
on the Revolution in France that:  
 
events in England in 1688 were a unique ‘act of necessity ‘to preserve ancient laws and 
liberties. He attacked events in France in 1789 as a gratuitous assault on legitimate 
government.218  
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I quote Burke here as it is worthy of note that this strand of historical opinion has existed for 
some time, and Burke was a contemporary at time of the French revolution. Abulafia, is 
following on in this tradition of ‘Whig’ history, Burke was also a ‘Whig’. Whilst arguably not as 
popular as it once was ‘Whig’ history never went away. The Guardian editorial states that 
Abulafia argued that the British are ‘milder in temper’ than the citizens of the continent. This 
a little different from what Abulafia actually said. The editorial also questions that the 
Abulafia had argued that anti-Semitism never struck deep roots in Britain. It goes further to 
describe these two arguments as “less like a history than an extract from the blurb on the 
back of a copy  
of Our Island story219.”220  This statement shows clearly that the editorial thinks very little of 
Abulafia’s arguments. Simply dismissing them as a short description on the back of a 
children’s book.   
 
The final paragraphs of the editorial point out that a terrible price was paid for failure of what 
was going on in Europe in 1930s. As well as that Britain has never been able to stand away 
from its neighbours for very long even at the height of empire. “Historians do a disservice to 
cast their country as a place apart when it can only prosper as part of a greater whole.”221 
This is the ending sentence in The Guardian editorial, the article is clear in its opposition to 
Historians for Britain and is in disagreement of David Abulafia’s arguments.  
 
At the time of the editorial’s publication, Historians for Britain weren’t arguing for Britain to be 
cast apart. Historians for Britain were pro-renegotiations in the first place, they hadn’t 
decided when they were formed that they would support a vote for Britain to leave the EU. It 
wasn’t until they had decided that Cameron’s terms were unacceptable that they decided to 
officially support Vote Leave. They used sometime over this decision and put this to a vote. 
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Some of their members still preferred Britain to remain part of the EU. The decision to 
support vote leave wasn’t made till 2016.222 The outcome of this vote even led to one former 
unnamed Historians for Britain supporter to change sides. Knapp pointed this out own 
reflections on the campaign, “one former Historian for Britain left when his erstwhile 
companions called for a No vote and offered his support for Historians for Britain in 
Europe.”223 The fact that the decision wasn’t made to support Vote Leave until 2016, calls 
into question the argument that, Historians for Britain were trying to cast their country apart 
at the time of the editorial’s publication in 2015. 
 
How would this negative portrayal in the national media be seen by Historians for Britain? I 
was able to discuss this with Oliver Lewis when I interviewed him in London. Lewis went as 
far to actually taking the Guardian editorial as a big compliment. This negative publicity 
actually generated more publicity for Historians for Britain and actually helped them boost 
their numbers in terms of supporters. Gwythian Prins didn’t sign the original Historians for 
Britain letter to the Times, however, having seen the raft of negative publicity on Historians 
for Britain came on-board and contributed with an essay on the EU eroding Britain’s global 
influence. As well as a number of academic posts, the vastly experienced historian has held 
jobs in government. Given that, Historians for Britain supporter numbers were much lower 
than their pro-European counterparts this extra support and publicity was welcomed. Lewis 
also pointed out, having sent copies of the essays to journalists he received a number of 
responses asking for hard copies to keep on their desks. Instead of facing questions on the 
actual essays he received questions on why historians had a role to play in any political 
debate, let alone one as important as the question of Britain’s membership of the EU.224  
 
Historians involved in political debate isn’t in itself a new thing. 19th century British historian 
Sir John Seeley, who argues Daddow, (“Seeley and his peers had a more than passing 
influence on professional and public thinking about history”225), argued that, “the study of 
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history was linked to the pursuit of politics in the present.”226 Although the historical 
profession has changed markedly from the 19th century, it is interesting that some continue 
on in the tradition of 19th century historians such as Seeley.  
 
4.4.2 Economist Bagehot column   
 
The Economist is a weekly magazine- format newspaper, it takes an editorial stance of 
classical and economic liberalism. The Bagehot227 column, is the section for weekly 
comment on current affairs in Britain, over the years a number of different writers have held 
the post. The Economist is known as medium where free thought is expressed. The Bagehot 
column has served for free thought and debate on British politics. It was in this column, 
where the historical side of the Brexit debate was discussed. 
 
On 25th July 2015, the Bagehot column turned its attention to historical side of the Brexit the 
debate. Jeremy Cliffe, an experienced British journalist and researcher was the author of the 
article, The psychology of a peninsula. Cliffe, described Historians for Britain as a smaller 
group of historians but it had more stardust. He also briefly summarised some of Historians 
for Britain’s arguments:  
 
citing Britain’s global links, its legal system and its ‘milder political temper’, Historians for 
Britain’s argued that the country’s history and traditions render it naturally separate from its 
European neighbours.228 
 
Cliffe also pointed out that, “a larger group of historians countered with the argument that, 
Britain’s fate has always been bound up with that of the continent; that in other words, the 
country is essentially European.”229 (Here Cliffe has summarised the two very different 
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letters to History Today which I discussed in chapter 3. In the following paragraphs, I will 
discuss some of the other points he raised. 
 
Cliffe believed that Britons will have voted according to brute self-interest, but their 
perception of that will be have been moulded by more emotional considerations. The leave 
side got this, Business for Britain, claimed that every UK household would be £933 better off 
every year outside the EU.230 However, the Eurosceptic think-tank made much larger 
arguments such as Britain’s otherness among European states, asserting that the country 
should reorient its economy and foreign policy towards colonies to which it is ‘culturally and 
psychologically’ closer than its neighbours.  
 
Cliffe also argued that, Historians for Britain was spun from Business for Britain. Indeed, it 
was the case that the idea for Historians for Britain came from Oliver Lewis while he was 
working for Business for Britain. However, I would question the power of the argument that 
Historians for Britain was spun out of Business for Britain. The reasons for this are: 
Historians for Britain at least claimed to be a non-partisan group made up of historians both 
of right and left political persuasions, not all of Historians for Britain supporters actually 
supported leave, some, despite their scepticism at the European project actually would have 
preferred Britain to remain part of the EU. Therefore, the argument that Historians for Britain 
was spun out of a Eurosceptic think-tank isn’t very powerful.  
 
I have previously stated that Historians for Britain were out of the starting blocks much 
earlier than the pro-European historians. This is also highlighted in this column. In terms of 
funding and cross-party co-ordination the pro-Europeans also lagged behind, something 
which Andrew Knapp of Historians for Britain in Europe also alluded to. In July 2015, polls 
had suggested that Britons were slightly in favour of a remain vote. However, at this stage 
this shouldn’t have been taken for granted. According to Cliffe, voters who may well have 
wished Britain to remain in the EU would need voter friendly facts. For example, a counter 
argument to Business for Britain’s dubious claim that each household would be £933 better 
off a year. He added that these counter arguments needed to be rooted into what the 




country’s history and present reveal about its interests and identity.231 Cliffe, stressed that 
there is no shortage of a material something few if any would argue with.   
 
Cliffe goes onto to make a number of points which show he was pro-European. He pointed 
out that, there were about 2 million Britons living in other EU member states and around 
about the same number of EU nationals living in Britain. On British exceptionalism he stated, 
“even the most striking examples, language, legal system and the products of centuries of 
communion with its neighbours.”232 He also quoted former British Prime Minister Margaret 
Thatcher herself no Europhile, “we are European, geographically and culturally and we 
cannot, disassociate ourselves with Europe.”233 Here I think it is worth quoting the late Tony 
Judt one of the best-known historians of modern Europe. When discussing the appeal of the 
‘European Union’ Judt pointed out, “that it pitted cosmopolitan modern development against 
old-fashioned, restrictive, and ‘artificial’ national constraints. This in turn may account for the 
special attraction of ‘Europe’ to the younger intelligentsia.”234 Perhaps this explains some of 
the appeal of the EU to Cliffe. 
 
Given Cliffe’s pro-European stance, what were his views on historians joining the debate? 
He actually welcomed both groups of historians. Bagehot, welcomed Historians for Britain to 
the debate as keenly as he did their pro-European sparring partners. This is markedly 
different than simply dismissing their narrative. And his reasons for this, he believed that the 
referendum must settle the EU question for at least a generation and, whatever the result 
the consequences will be momentous.235  
 




234 Tony Judt and Jennifer Homans, When the Facts Change : Essays, 1995-2010 (London 
New York: William Heinemann 
Penguin Press HC, The, 2015). p.39. 
235 Cliffe. (2015). 
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Writing now with hindsight we now know the consequences of the referendum to be 
momentous. However, it remains unclear whether this referendum will have settled the EU 
issue for a generation. There are almost daily calls for second referendum, or a referendum 
on the terms Britain gets from the EU upon completion of negotiations by her Majesty’s 
government. The difficult yet important question: who are we? Was raised by Cliffe at the 
end of the article. This question can polarise people there are no easy answers. 
Nevertheless, it is important to at least offer insights to this question, and here in my view, is 
a place where historians could offer their insights. This article was warmly received by Oliver 
Lewis, he thought that the sensible concerns with the EU project raised by Historians for 
Britain were picked up by the media. He believed this article was a good example of this.236   
 
4.4.3 Historians on the radio 
 
Gwythian Prins and Margaret Macmillan237 are two vastly experienced historians. They 
discussed a number of issues concerning Britain’s place in Europe and the rest of the world 
in 2015, on BBC radio. Before I discuss the debate between the two historians I will briefly 
outline the origin of the source. I found the audio of the discussion on YouTube, I have 
searched on the actual BBC website for the clip but have been unable to find it. I believe the 
historians to have went on air on the BBC Radio 4 Today programme, sometime in 2015. 
The reason for this is, it is clear Nick Robinson one of the hosts of the programme is chairing 
the discussion. He greets the two professors’ by saying good morning. As the Today 
programme always airs on the morning I take it to be this show. The clip-on YouTube is 
about 5 minutes long and during these 5 minutes I am unable to get a precise date. I believe 
the year to be 2015 as Prins refereed listeners to his essay Beyond the Ghosts: Does EU 
membership erode Britain’s global influence? This was published on the Historians for 
Britain website and signed by the author, 2015. I will reference to the YouTube clip in my 
footnotes in the following paragraphs.238 
 
                                                          
236 Email correspondence with Oliver Lewis, 18/09/2017. 
237 Margaret Macmillan, born 23/12/1943, Canadian historian and Professor at The University of 
Oxford.  
238 The BBC hasn’t replied to any of my emails asking for the date for this source. 
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On opening the discussion presenter Nick Robinson says that there was a debate taking 
place amongst eminent historians. Robinson stated that, Prins main argument was that both 
Europe and Britain were haunted by ghosts, which were clouding their judgement about 
Britain’s proper future. The ghosts according to Prins are, the long-established fear of British 
decline something which has marred the British elite since the Suez239 crisis. British decline 
had begun some years previous to this “after 1945 it became clear that the British had no 
hope of holding onto their empire.”240 The Suez crisis was the first major example of Britain’s 
lack of resources to maintain a continental presence. For the European ghost Prins claimed 
that it was the fear of the return of war. This caused people to argue that in some way the 
European Union has being the cause of the prevention of the return of war since the Second 
World War, Prins stressed history did not support this argument. 
 
Robinson got Prins to offer more detail to his arguments one at a time. Taking the idea that 
Britain is in decline, Robinson pointed out that it has long being said that Britain has lost an 
empire and yet to find a role. Therefore, it has often been argued that the EU was Britain’s 
future. Prins comes back on this saying this was the argument made 40 years in Britain’s 
previous referendum on the then EEC membership. Prins believed at the time that that 
argument could have been plausible, however, Prins stated that things have moved on now. 
He stated that Britain was now a rising power and quoted the Foreign Office saying that 
Britain was a soft super power. According to Prins, Britain had better institutional links with 
the rest of the world than any other European country. Prins thought that we must not allow 
ourselves to be dominated by the what he calls the ghosts. This was the point of his essay 
which I mentioned in the start of his subsection. He was at this point allowed to recommend 
listeners to go to the Historians for Britain website to read his essay. The presenter was 
happy to add that the programme could tweet this link after the discussion was over. This is 
                                                          
239 British interest in Egypt stemmed directly from the importance of India. The Suez Canal could 
reduce journey times between the North Atlantic and northern Indian Oceans by approximately 
7000 kilometres. President Nasser of Egypt nationalised the Suez Canal company in 1955. An Anglo-
French force set about dealing with the troublesome Egyptian PM in 1956, initially everything went 
according to plan. However, the Americans were furious as what seen as an Anglo-French deception 
in not letting Washington know their true intentions. The British and French withdrew from the Suez 
Canal, the important waterway remained in Egyptian hands. The lesson for the British from this was, 
they lacked the resources to maintain a colonial presence. Judt.(2005): p.293-298. 
240 Ibid. p.293. 
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an example of a Historians for Britain supporter been able to promote their arguments and 
essays in the national media. 
 
After the recommendation of Prin’s essay, the presenter invited Margaret Macmillan to come 
in on the discussion. Macmillan, stated that if Britain wasn’t in decline she didn’t really know 
what indicators would show that it was rising. Macmillan argued that Britain was once very 
important to Canada. She stated that this was no longer the case. There was less trade with 
Britain than there used to be, less immigrants from Britain and no the family ties of the past. 
This, alongside the special relationship with the United States being one more talked about 
in Britain than the United States led Macmillan to disagree with Prins on Britain being a 
rising power. Prins is keen to use Britain’s Commonwealth links to counter Macmillan’s 
arguments. Prins believed that, Britain was in a unique position due to The Queen being the 
head of the Commonwealth to revive its trading links with the Commonwealth. The future he 
argued, lay here as Commonwealth countries such as India were growing at a much faster 
rate than the EU, which was in decline. 
 
Robinson invited Macmillan to comment on ghost two, the idea that Europeans are too 
obsessed with avoiding war instead of looking towards the future. Macmillan is in slight 
agreement with this point, pointing out that the creators of the European project were very 
conscious of avoiding war. However, there was now fewer and fewer who remembered the 
Second World War and none who remembered the First, perhaps now was the time to look 
ahead. Macmillan, did argue that the EU had played some part in making Europe a continent 
much less likely to go to war. Prins, argued that it was the Marshall Plan and NATO 
dominated by the Anglosphere what has kept peace and keeps Britain safe today. Given 
this, Prins believed there was no need to be part of the EU to be kept safe. Robinson after 
stating that he thought historians to be good at offering a long perspective, asked Macmillan 
for her thoughts on the future of the EU. Macmillan, stressed that historians are bad at 
predicting things. She did, however, offer her views that the EU was a project which needed 
to be reformed. It was a project she would be reluctant to write off. Unfortunately, the clip 
ends just as Prins is about to offer his final thoughts.241     
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The previous paragraphs are a reconstruction of the discussion between Prins and 
Macmillan in 2015. The discussion is an example of how historians responded to the Brexit 
debate. It is also an example of the activities and arguments they promoted. In this case the 
activity was an appearance on national radio where they were able to promote their 
arguments, and in the case of Prins promote his essay. The two historians differed very 
much on their views on the EU and Britain’s place in the world. But was their much 
substance in their arguments? Had Prins argued in the tradition of ‘Whig’ history and of a 
kind of English Sonderweg? The ghosts he discussed could be something what in his view 
blocked this ‘special path’ of English history. Macmillan, on the other hand, argued that 
actually British history wasn’t so special after all, and that Britain wasn’t a leading player like 
Prins made out. I will discuss some of their arguments in the following paragraphs.   
 
Prins argued that should Britain look towards the Commonwealth. He didn’t see this as a trip 
back to the days of British empire. This on the contrary, was a move towards the future. As 
Prins seen it the Commonwealth countries were growing faster than the EU. The EU itself 
was a project in decline. Therefore, Britain should look away from the EU and towards the 
rest of the world. Do Prins’s arguments stand-up, or on the other hand, was he just making 
the case for Britain to leave the EU at all costs? Economists Mark Baimbridge and Professor 
Philip Whyman made similar arguments in 2012.  
 
Many Commonwealth countries offer potentially faster growing markets than other EU 
member states. Historic links with Commonwealth nations could give the UK a potential 
advantage in establishing links with these dynamic economies.242  
 
This shows Prins arguments were shared by others, however, the important word here is 
could. Economists and historians aren’t able to predict the future, they can offer arguments 
as to how they think things might turn out.  
 
Is Britain in a state of decline? This is a difficult question but, nonetheless, an important one 
to attempt. What standards should we measure this decline by? Indeed, it is the case that 
Britain no longer has an empire where the sun never sets. But on the other hand, the Queen 
                                                          




the British head of state is also the head of the Commonwealth something which potentially 
puts Britain in a good position for future trade deals and alliances. The English language 
dominates the world stage, three British universities make the list of the world’s top 10243. 
Britain’s economy was hit hard like many others by the financial crash in 2008. However, it 
has recovered much better than, for example, Spain, Italy and Portugal who are also 
European Union members. Britain has lower rates of unemployment in comparison to many 
of her European neighbours and higher wages. On the other hand, wages and living 
standards haven’t risen significantly in the UK for a number of years now. National debt 
stands at around 80% of GDP. These are just some of the arguments one could make to 
show that Britain wasn’t in decline or was in decline. And, indeed, politicians, historians and 
many others do use them to demonstrate their respective cases. Macmillan argued that, “if 
Britain wasn’t in decline she didn’t know what demonstrated it was a nation in 
ascendency.”244 Nevertheless, they are many ways in which one could attempt to measure 
this. However, it is still very difficult as there are so many different arguments and 
measurements as to whether a nation is on the rise or on the decline.  
 
The so called ‘special relationship’ between Britain and the United States is a much-debated 
issue. This relationship, argue those in favour of Brexit and at times those who are not will 
be even more important after Brexit. Potential future trade deals will be very important when 
Britain leaves the world’s biggest single trading bloc. Whether good trade links will be 
achievable between Britain and Donald Trump’s administration remain very much to be 
seen. Is this special relationship more important to Britain or the United States? Or equally 
as important to both parties? Again, there is no set yardstick here to answer these questions 
or to back up Macmillan’s arguments. Indeed, it was the case that Britain joined a US led 
coalition in wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. President George Bush even went as far as 
saying, “America has no truer friend than Great Britain.”245 But would America have gone to 
war without British backing? In all likelihood yes, indeed, it didn’t stop America in Vietnam. 
“President Johnson had suggested that a token British force be sent to South Vietnam. 
                                                          
243 According to the Times Higher Education world university rankings. 
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Prime Minister Wilson refused this on the grounds that the British army was already 
stretched.”246. So, in the face of a terror attack on American soil it would seem highly unlikely 
America wouldn’t go to war without British support. In terms of trade, “by 1821 the United 
States took 44 per cent of its imports from Britain and only 7 per cent from France. Two 
centuries later, trade with North America remains a pillar of the British economy.”247 Whether 
the relationship is special or not is difficult to say. There is without doubt a relationship 
between both countries. There is substance in both of the historian’s arguments. It is 
possible to agree and disagree with them for various reasons, some of which I have outlined 
here. 
 
Prins and Macmillan made a number of arguments on BBC radio. One may well have 
reasons for either, agreeing or disagreeing with the arguments they made. The clip showed 
is that historians were very much involved in the Brexit debate. Listeners to the show may 
well have been inspired to do further research into the arguments made. Or, it may have 
added some weight into what people already thought about Britain’s place in the world and 
on the upcoming EU referendum. Given their positions as historians perhaps some will have 
seen them as an authority on matters of the past. This authority, may well have been 
welcomed on such a complex issue the Britain’s place in Europe and the rest of the world is. 
      
4.5 Concluding remarks 
 
Historians were active participants in the debate that raged prior to the Brexit referendum. 
They did so personally and as members of their respective groups. The two most active 
groups of historians in the run-up to the referendum were Historians for Britain and 
Historians for Britain in Europe. There was little love lost between the two. Both made 
passionate arguments, applying their knowledge of Britain’s past to the question, should 
Britain remain or opt to leave the European Union. Printed articles, radio appearances, TV 
appearances are some examples of the activities historians took part in to promote their 
arguments. This was alongside their websites, were links to articles and statements from 
supporters were available freely for everyone. Historians involvement also had an effect on 
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the Brexit debate itself. As discussed in this chapter, the Guardian ran an editorial on 
historian’s involvement, the Economist discussed their involvement in one of their famous 
columns and BBC Radio 4 gave historians air time to promote their arguments on their 
flagship news program. These are examples of the platforms historians had to offer their 
arguments. Historian’s arguments in the Brexit debate gave the debate at large a different 
dynamic. They weren’t coming with, for example, a mass of statistics claiming to show 
Britons would be better or worse off depending on the result, this is something Vote Leave 
and the Remain Campaign both did, some which have since been proved to be dubious. On 
the contrary, historians used their analyses of Britain’s past to argue both for Leave and 
Remain and to add much needed context. With so many dubious facts and fake news, 
historian’s arguments, I would argue, gave the debate a much-welcomed extra dynamic.   
 
 




Chapter 5: Aftermath 
 
5.1 Introduction  
 
By the time summer came in 2016, the referendum was over as was David Cameron’s time 
at 10 Downing Street. However, the debate on Brexit was far from over – it had just begun. 
The following chapter will discuss the aftermath of the Brexit vote, with particular emphasis 
on the historians and constellations of historians discussed in the previous chapter. What 
happened to these historians? Did they continue their engagement? Did they change sides 
and if so, why? Did new historians and formations emerge – if so, who were they and which 
arguments did they bring to the debate?    
     
5.2 Historians and Brexit: An opportunity missed? 
 
In July 2016, and indeed the immediate wake of the political earthquake of the Brexit vote 
the editor of History Today magazine Paul Lay used his editorial to offer his account of the 
role played by historians in the run-up to the referendum. Lay, himself a remain voter was 
critical to both sides arguing, “a more nuanced conversation among historians of multiple 
perspectives and specialisations would have been a good thing and might have led to a 
higher level of public debate.”248 As we have seen a number of historians did make the case 
for leave, however, they were in the minority. Lay argued those who made the case for leave 
were mainly all well-established men, close to retirement age or already retired who had 
nothing to lose by going public with their views. In some cases, their Eurosceptic views were 
already well-known, for instance, Andrew Roberts who has been described as the, “leading 
Eurosceptic historian.”249  Looking at the demographic profile of Historians for Britain, it is 
easy to understand Lays argument as the constraints of time, money and career prospects 
would most likely not concern most of the supporters of Historians for Britain, in the same 
way it would younger colleagues.  
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When I interviewed Paul Lay, he went further to say that, “what was interesting was that 
those historians who backed leave were often much more cosmopolitan than those who 
backed remain.”250 This is a highly interesting observation, yet Lay did not define 
cosmopolitan which can have various meanings, including research subjects. David 
Abulafia’s has offered the following reasoning behind devoting himself to the history of Spain 
and Italy: “I like warm, sunny places with good food, handsome buildings, fine vistas and 
cheerful inhabitants.”251 It could also be argued that this says something about class. Some 
may see the pursuit of history in warmer climates as something which the elites and upper-
classes take part in. Perhaps this made it difficult for Historians for Britain to engage with the 
British public, they were arguably too elitist. To historians’ counterfactuals tend to come with 
health-warnings as they factor out actors or events in the past. Here, there is at least ground 
for a counterfactual speculation, if the leave vote hadn’t happened, would this have been 
because of, or despite, the involvement of Historians for Britain?  
     
Lay, also discussed historians who had supported the remain campaign. A number of 
distinguished historians just prior to the referendum, assembled themselves in Downing 
Street in support of remain campaign at the invitation of George Osbourne. A number of 
them, “have since expressed regret at becoming so close to a government they were hardly 
enamoured with.”252 A letter in the Guardian soon followed. In the letter, over 300 historians 
said, “a vote to leave the EU would condemn Britain to irrelevance.”253 The list of signatories 
included, Niall Ferguson and Simon Schama both familiar to the public through their 
television documentaries and popular books. One might have expected Ferguson an arch 
Thatcherite to have been on the other side. Oliver Lewis attempted to contact him on a 
number of occasions in an attempt to gain his support for Historians for Britain.254 Ferguson, 
didn’t respond, and eventually came out to publically back remain and then some months 
after the referendum changed his mind and said he was wrong. Lay when discussing the 
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historians visiting Downing Street argued that, “historians should speak truth to power, not 
for it.”255  
 
Was then Brexit an opportunity missed for historians? According to Lay this was very much 
the case. Historians could have engaged with the public a lot more. The vast majority of 
them didn’t engage at all. While 300 signatories on one letter to the public may seem like a 
lot of historians. There are many more historians in Britain who didn’t sign, or show in 
anyway support for Historians for Britain, or any other groups of historians. To illustrate his 
point, Lay, pointed out that most of the larger university towns voted remain by quite large 
margins. He also had a map attached to his History Today editorial, colour coded to which 
areas voted leave and which voted remain. It is clear from the map that: London, 
Cambridge, Oxford and Newcastle256 were remain areas. This, according to Lay, shows the 
failure of academics based in Cambridge, Oxford and London to engage with anyone 
outside these areas.257 True, the voting pattern of these areas are clear, but there could be a 
variety of reasons for the clear remain vote in these areas. I would also note that during the 
interview, it became clear that Lay distanced himself from the academic environment of 
Oxbridge and Cambridge. Stating how they came from different worlds, (which in Britain 
tends to mean different classes).   
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(retrieved 22/05/2018). Parts in Yellow voted remain, parts in blue leave.  
 
 
5.2.1 Niall Ferguson and Brexit  
 
As of 2018, Ferguson holds positions at Cambridge and the Hoover Institution, Stanford. In 
addition to his academic posts he is a political commentator and journalist. One can be fairly 
sure that Lay and others would describe him as a well-established man. One doesn’t have to 
go too far back to see examples of Ferguson’s Eurosceptism. For instance, in a 2015 article 
published in Prospect  
(a British monthly general interest magazine) Ferguson argued, “Europe is not quite 
stagnating, but it certainly isn’t growing dynamically. It is failing to create jobs especially for 
the young and immigrants. In the EU, bureaucrats like nothing better than to draw up 
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complicated regulations and impose them on the rest of us.”258 Here Ferguson shows he is 
no Europhile, yet prior to the referendum he was one of the most outspoken remain 
supporters. Ferguson is friends with David Cameron and George Osbourne, reflecting on 
giving them support afterwards Ferguson has stated that, “he was wrong on Brexit, he had 
wanted to keep his friends in Number 10 and 11.”259 Could Ferguson’s position have as 
much to do with supporting friends as about Brexit itself? His position is difficult to pin-point, 
but what is true is Ferguson enjoys the limelight and publicity. In supporting the two most 
powerful men in Britain he certainly gained some of this.   
 
Jack Doyle, the political editor of the Daily Mail has combined some of Fergusons 
statements pre-referendum into one article. According to Doyle, Ferguson is an eminent 
historian who largely came forward as the intellectual champion of the remain camp. Some 
of Ferguson’s interesting statements include, ‘it is the proponents of Brexit who are the 
utopians. Far from been Eurosceptics, they are Anglo-loonies.’ ‘History shows that when 
Britain disengages from the continent, the continent goes to hell in a handcart. The notion 
that we can sail off to the Atlantic and drop our anchor close to Bermuda is absurd.’260 These 
are just some of Ferguson’s public statements pre-referendum. He doesn’t hold back when 
making his case, and uses the various media platforms available to him to make his 
arguments.   
 
So why then just a few months after the referendum did he perform an astonishing U-turn? 
In a Boston Globe article Ferguson offers his own account. Firstly, he admits he was “a 
staunch Thatcherite. As well as a proud Eurosceptic.”261 He goes further in the article to 
explain his reasons for his change of stance. “He had convinced himself that the costs of 
Brexit would outweigh the benefits. But most importantly he admitted the biggest factor was 
his personal friendship with Cameron and Osbourne. Ferguson said, he even wrote things 
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which he in fact doubted a first in his career he claimed. He claimed to have done this to try 
and keep his friends in power, something he later thought was wrong and sorry for.”262  
 
In October 2017, Ferguson published his book, The square and the tower. Networks, 
hierarchies and the struggles for global power. As discussed previously, some interesting 
networks of historians emerged in the run-up to the Brexit referendum. Although Ferguson, 
didn’t devote much of this book to his views on Brexit, he does make some notable 
observations, including, describing “Dominic Cummings263 as the architect of the ‘Vote 
Leave’ victory.”264. Ferguson, points out that the odds were stacked against leave, due to 
their limited budget (£10m) and limited time (ten months). Nonetheless, Vote Leave was 
able to win a narrow victory. Cummings argued, that one of the keys to victory were nearly a 
billion targeted digital adverts.265 Cummings himself has expressed:  
 
the importance of the hard work done by others such as, Oliver Lewis. Although the hard 
work done by Lewis and others was unknown outside the office, they made extreme efforts 
and ran rings round so called ‘experts’.266  
 
Ferguson, summarises his argument as to how Brexit was won as, “Brexit, was a victory for 
a network – and network science – over the hierarchy of the British establishment.”267 As I 
have pointed out, Ferguson preferred to have his place in the British establishment than to 
join the smaller network of Historians for Britain. Hindsight, is indeed a great thing and 
Ferguson writes with hindsight now on Brexit. Fergusons change of stance shows no matter 
how far up the academic hierarchy one is (or at least sees himself as being), it is possible for 
one to change their stance. 
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5.3 Historians after the Brexit referendum  
 
What did the supporters of Historians for Britain and other groups do after the referendum? 
In the case of Historians for Britain, one could argue that their job was done, the British 
people voted leave on 23rd June 2016. Maybe this is why their website was taken down. 
However, the Brexit debate has raged on since June 2016. There are many different 
arguments as to how, and on what terms Britain should leave the EU.  
 
As to reasons why historians should still be involved, it is worth looking at one of A.C. 
Grayling’s268 Tweets, where attempts to make the case for Brexit to be stopped. “Brexit is 
the First World War all over again: a stupid, destructive utterly unnecessary waste. Led by 
donkeys. But this time we the people will stop it.”269 This is just one example of many tweets 
by Grayling, and, others with similar views on Brexit, arguing for Brexit to be stopped. Such 
arguments, and general negativity in the British media about Brexit particularly from the BBC 
have led to the formation of new web platform, called Briefings for Brexit.  
 
Briefings for Brexit is a digital think-tank with support from a wide range of professions of 
which historian is one. Their supporters regularly publish essays on the website as well as in 
the national media. In addition to this, some of their supporters have made a number of TV 
and radio appearances. In the ‘our mission’ section of the website they argue that, “there is a 
prevailing media view that all sensible and informed people oppose Brexit. Even going as far 
to associate support for Brexit with low levels of education and intellect.”270 Historians and 
other academics are contributing daily to Briefings for Brexit. It is here where some of the 
previous supporters of Historians for Britain are making their case, and arguing for the 
decision of the British people, “to be fully and positively carried out.”271 They also argue that 
Brexit can actually be a very positive thing, for Britain and its people. 
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5.3.1 Briefings for Brexit  
 
There are nine historians among the contributors of Briefings for Brexit. Andrew Roberts, 
David Abulafia and Robert Tombs are the three of the nine whom had previous affiliation 
with Historians for Britain. Tombs also serves as one of the editors for Briefings for Brexit. 
Tombs most recent book was published in 2014, The English and their History, 
encompasses nearly 1000 pages and covers English history from 600BC up until 2014. The 
majority of Tombs previous publications in his long career have mainly been on French 
history. Some scholars may argue that, having studied other regions Tombs may have a 
good vantage point to study the country where he comes from. Moreover, this has allowed 
Tombs to apply both an insider’s and outsider’s perspective as well as a comparative 
dimension. On the other hand, some may argue why is a scholar who has specialised in 
French history now the spokesperson for Briefings for Brexit.  
 
It appears to be Tombs who is the standard bearer amongst the historians who contribute to 
Briefings for Brexit. He has appeared on TV and radio making the case for Brexit to be 
carried through, as well as regularly publishing articles on their website and in the media. In 
an email correspondence, I had with Tombs in October 2017 he stated then his position 
was, “that the decision has been taken, and must be carried through vigorously.”272 They 
want to show that there is no united view amongst the establishment, which is loosely 
defined as, “a network of vested interests, which every government are obliged to respect”273 
on Brexit. Some highly educated and influence people in their view, do wish for the vote of 
the British people to be carried through.   
 
What then is the importance of historians in this group? Are they, for example, bringing 
something to the debate on the terms of Brexit, acting as a kind of authority against those 
that want to hamper or even stop Brexit? Perhaps it is more difficult now for historians to 
offer historical arguments to the debate. The decision has been taken and the debate on the 
terms of Britain’s exit is very current. It seems difficult to find a historical analogy for leaving 
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the EU, as no country other than Greenland has actually left. Pro-European politicians such 
as Nick Clegg have found themselves compared to Vidkun Quisling the Norwegian Nazi 
puppet.274 Such historical anachronisms, spurred on by Brexit add weight to the argument 
that historians should be contributing to the debate.   
 
In a Tombs blog piece, Brexit suggests we’re on the right side of history published in late 
2017, Tombs places the Brexit process in a larger historical frame. Tombs, uses examples 
from the past and applies them to the current problems of Brexit being carried through. 
Firstly, he opens the blog with, “history often helps us to see our problems in 
proportion.”275.He argues, “never in modern times has there been such an overt and even 
contemptuous attempt to deny the legitimacy of a popular vote.”276 This is an argument 
where the distinction between a political and academic argument at best can be described 
as blurry.  
 
Tombs goes further to bring in a number of examples from history. Indeed, some British 
politicians may also do this given that a large number of them studied history. For instance, 
the highly pro-Brexit MP Jacob Rees Mogg277, is well-known for deploying historical 
arguments. Tombs, quotes Edmund Burke, British Prime Minister William Gladstone and 
French political theorist Alexis de Tocqueville. All of these historical figures argued at some 
point that it is important that the will of the people is respected. As a historian, Tombs, uses 
quotes from historical figures in this piece to argue that the will of the British people should 
be respected on Brexit. While Rees Mogg, and other MPs are also capable of doing the 
same, they do so in their capacity as politicians. It has been highlighted part of the reason 
for the British people voting Brexit was because of distrust in politics and politicians. Perhaps 
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historian’s arguments will be better received by the public than those politicians make, but it 
is hard to know this further without in-depth studies.  
 
Another notable observation in the article is on the issue of Brexit and identity. Again, Tombs 
draws on quotes from the past to formulate his arguments. For instance, English novelist 
George Orwell once said in his famous essay, The Lion and the Unicorn278, “The English 
intelligentsia are Europeanized. England is perhaps the only country whose intellectuals are 
ashamed of their own nationality.”279  In this light, Tombs says he feels an odd sense of déjà-
vu when listening to remainers unquestionably supporting the EU commission. Another 
relevant Orwell quote from the same essay is, “the English intelligentsia take their cookery 
from Paris and their opinions from Moscow.”280 Tombs also uses these quotes from Orwell in 
his blog piece. As Tombs sees it, those influential people who want Britain to remain in the 
EU will give their support to the EU at all costs.  
 
Tombs also discusses what he sees as the ‘revulsion’ of British history from some of British 
societies greatest institutions (including the BBC and The Guardian). As Tombs sees it there 
is a revulsion against:  
 
the internalised caricature of British history: imperialism, exploitation, oppression. We rarely 
know enough to form a more balanced picture: few advanced countries teach their children 
less history than we do.281 
 
Tombs and his colleagues, on the contrary, continue to discuss, what they see as, the 
unique nature of British history. They deploy this version of history to argue for Brexit to be 
carried out, and that it could be a very positive thing for Britain.   
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5.4 Relations between historians after the referendum 
 
The debate about Brexit and its implications has already had a profound impact on British 
society, and the academics who work there. One thing that is clear, is that the majority of 
historians who went public with their views would have preferred Britain to remain in the EU. 
What then of those historians whom preferred Britain to leave and voted to do so or came to 
that position after the referendum?  “Concerns have been expressed for those academics 
mainly in fairly junior positions who express views which favour Brexit. It is believed, that a 
considerable number of scholars are concerned for their careers if they express such 
views.”282 Briefings for Brexit, have stated that they are, “sorry colleagues feel this way and 
believe they are right to be worried.”283 
 
It is interesting that in a country and, its universities which pride itself on free speech has 
come to such a situation where people are afraid to come forward and express their views. 
How did it come to this? This is a complex question to answer, but an important one to 
attempt.  
 
Turning back to Historians for Britain as we have seen their list of supporters was made up 
of well-established older historians who were predominately male. One could argue that, 
those older historians who supported Historians for Britain had nothing to lose in terms of 
their careers. Moreover, their Eurosceptic views were often already known to the public so it 
wouldn’t make much difference that they were so publically in favour of Brexit for their 
careers. The best example here is Andrew Roberts, who as I mentioned earlier in this thesis 
has been described as the leading Eurosceptic historian. Has such a group really done any 
favours to those less established historians who perhaps shared their Eurosceptic views? 
Would a junior Eurosceptic academic with a lesser known university in the UK really have 
wanted to show their support for Historians for Britain? In a debate where the majority of the 
                                                          




media, political class and establishment wanted to stay it was difficult and, indeed, still is 
difficult for academics to express Eurosceptic views.  
 
So far in this chapter, I have mainly discussed Eurosceptic historians, some of the historians 
who campaigned for Britain to remain have continued to make their voices known after the 
referendum. They didn’t get the result they wanted from the referendum. Yet some of them 
continue to speak out mainly on what terms Britain leaves the EU on or some even go as far 
as wanting to stop Brexit. One of these scholars is Tanja Bueltmann284. Bueltmann, is a 
German historian who has lived in England for a number of years, and who has continued to 
make a passionate case for remain. Bueltmann uses her Twitter account to post something 
she calls ‘Tanjas’ daily. Here, she publishes daily thoughts and ideas often in video format 
on the state of the Brexit process as she sees it. She has also had a number of articles 
published in newspapers and magazines where she also makes a passionate European 
case. Bueltmann sees herself as an EU citizen living in Britain, for her Brexit is very much an 
emotional issue. Her article in the Times Higher Education magazine, Anti-Brexit historians 
must dare to be political, was published in March 2018. The article offers some points on the 
role of the historian – and could potentially shed some light onto the relationships between 
historians. These points, and their implications will be discussed in the following paragraphs.   
 
Firstly, Bueltmann’s own views are very clear in the article. She wants anti-Brexit historians 
to be political. “Historians must not let Boris Johnson285 and other armchair scholars take 
centre stage in their discipline.”286 Further into the article, Bueltmann raises the point that:  
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history is frequently employed by those who wish to serve their own ideology or their own 
interests, they use history to establish a particular narrative to facilitate an anti-EU argument 
or invoke nostalgia for a glorious imperial past that never existed.287  
 
Here it is clear she is taking a stand against those who backed and continue to back Brexit. 
It is true, that memories of Britain’s ‘glorious’ past as some seen it where used throughout 
the Brexit debate. Bueltmann goes further to say, “while history is frequently used, historians 
themselves- academics and experts more broadly – are derided and dismissed.”288 This 
counter’s some of the things I have found out in this project, historians were given a platform 
in the media, radio and TV both before and after the referendum. Perhaps Bueltmann is 
referring to more recent developments, with pro-EU historians and other pro-Europeans 
finding themselves increasingly side-lined as Brexit draws ever closer. 
 
Earlier in this thesis I pointed out that some academics have found it difficult to express that 
they voted Brexit or are sceptical of the European project. Which brings me to an important 
point Bueltmann made, “judges, MPs, the civil service and essentially anyone who questions 
anything about Brexit are attacked as traitors.”289 Has the Brexit debate now gone full circle? 
Bueltmann, uses strong language to illustrate her point. But similar language has also been 
used by the British media, to attack MPs who voted to block some of the Brexit bills which 
need to be passed through parliament so Britain can leave the EU. The Daily Telegraph 
called the rebellious MPs mutineers and the Mail traitors. The Brexit debate has become 
very toxic indeed.  
 
Where then does this leave historians? I would argue, that the relationships between those 
that continue to involve themselves in the Brexit debate won’t be very cordial. One doesn’t 
have to look far on Twitter to see some of the negative comments such outspoken historians 
as Bueltmann and Robert Tombs receive. Bueltmann, at times has even taken a break from 
Twitter and campaigning due to the large amount of abusive emails and Tweets she has 
received. Historians turning political comes at a cost. A simple search of their name will bring 






up a number examples, although most seem to be from Twitter trolls and not from other 
historians. Bueltmann ends her piece by saying, “this is a climate in which historians can 
provide much needed context and interpretation.”290 While those historians at Briefings for 
Brexit will disagree with a number of Bueltmann’s arguments, they are likely to be in full 
agreement with her here. Perhaps if other historians and the public can value each other’s 
opinions, and bear in mind that context is important in this political climate, a more nuanced 
debate may be possible.   
 
5.5 Concluding remarks    
 
As the British government attempts to negotiate Britain’s exit from the European Union, the 
debate between historians continues. Leaving the European Union is proving more 
problematic and complicated than anyone ever predicted. In fact, it was rumoured the 
government actually made no plans for a leave victory. David Cameron and George 
Osbourne resigned their positions very soon after the referendum. Theresa May attempted 
to bring more strength and stability into government by calling a snap general election. 
However, this backfired and led to the government becoming even weaker than it already 
was.  
 
As for the historians, we have met earlier in this thesis, a number continue to offer views and 
thoughts as to how the Brexit referendum result will shape Britain in years to come. 
However, their names and communication platforms have changed. For instance, Briefings 
for Brexit is the group some Eurosceptic historians have attached themselves too, and 
Academics for Europe is the group where pro-European historians have aligned too. The 
activities historians take part in are by and large the same, written articles, radio and TV 
appearances, podcasts, blogs and seminars are used to promote their arguments.   
 
Historians can offer a different perspective than politicians, whom have been out of favour 
with the British public for some time. As I have discussed in this chapter some do very much 
that. Historians can also fulfil different roles. Two examples of this are Robert Tombs serving 
as editor for Briefings for Brexit, and Tanja Bueltmann who as well as holding a position at 




the University of Northumbria is very active as an anti-Brexit activist. Unlike Tombs and 
some of the other historians who involve and involved themselves in the Brexit debate 
Bueltmann isn’t retired. Nonetheless, Bueltmann travels Britain to campaign against Brexit. I 
would expect the Brexit debate to go on for some years to come, even after Britain leaves I 
would expect some will continue to call for another referendum, better trade deals and many 
other things. Historians will continue to take part in the debate, and as some of them have 





Chapter 6: Conclusion 
 
The Brexit referendum led to the formation of a number of groups of historians. The two 
main actors in this thesis, Historians for Britain and Historians for Britain in Europe were two 
such groups. Both parties, used a variety of platforms to involve themselves in the debate. 
These included, newspapers, magazines, podcasts, radio and TV appearances as well as 
blogs. These scholars launched themselves into the debate on the basis of being academic 
authorities in their respective fields. Interestingly, these fields did not necessarily have to do 
with the relationship between Britain and Europe – being a historian seems to have been 
sufficient qualification in itself. What unified both groups were their shared understanding of 
the past and the firm belief that this understanding ought to have ramifications /implications 
for political choices made today.  
 
Historians for Britain in Europe, made the argument that Britain’s past was only understood 
as a part of a larger whole. Britain, they argued, has engaged with her European neighbours 
for centuries. Their argument was this path needed to be continued and they created a 
vision how a leave vote would cast Britain adrift. Hence, stability would be replaced by chaos 
and uncertainty. Historians for Britain on the other hand, argued that Britain’s history and in 
particular that of England was unique and different from her European counterparts. In this 
thesis, I used the term Sonderweg when discussing Historians for Britain’s understanding of 
the past. In their view, the consequence of acknowledging that English history followed a 
special path, was that Britain needed to leave the EU in order to reconnect and continue 
down the lane she is destined for.    
 
Turning back to my research question: Did historians have any effect on the Brexit debate as 
well as the communities of British historians it involved? I would argue historians provided 
much needed context to the debate. It wasn’t just economic concerns people went to the 
ballot box with on June 23rd, 2016. The issue of identity was also of importance. This is an 
area, I would argue, where historians can provide important insights, so people better 
understand identity, their history and where they came from. This wasn’t something the 
official Leave and Remain campaigns offered. At least not in the depth some of the 
historians I have discussed did. Historians involvement in the debate had a twofold effect, 
context and ideas towards the complex question of who the people on the Isles called Britain 
are, (British, European, English, Scottish, Welsh). These aren’t easy questions, but being 
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historians, who are used to working with difficult questions without any clear answers they at 
least offered some ideas. These ideas and arguments were picked up in the British media 
prior to the referendum. Historians continue to provide context to the ongoing Brexit debate, 
which I would argue is welcome, given the, complex situation Britain finds itself in after the 
referendum. 
 
The two groups of historians disagreed markedly on their versions of Britain’s past. This was 
also picked up by the British media. For instance, History Today publishing two letters from 
the different groups as well has the Financial Times column I discussed in chapter 1, where 
some of the arguments the groups made were discussed. This I would argue effected the 
Brexit debate. It showed that it wasn’t just politicians who could make the case for Leave or 
Remain. Historians were capable of making the case also, and like politicians they could 
disagree and offer counter arguments to each other. They were able to affect the debate by 
writing in newspapers and magazines, contributing to their groups website and some were 
invited onto TV and radio to make their arguments. Some Remain supporting historians 
were even invited to Downing Street in support of the Chancellor who was campaigning for 
Remain. Across Britain many people campaigned for remain, yet few were invited into 
Downing Street. This shows that historians were very much important actors in the Brexit 
debate. 
 
Those that involved themselves so publically in the Brexit debate have found out this can 
come at a price. As I have pointed out in chapter 5, one doesn’t have to look far on Twitter to 
see the online abuse some historians receive. Through my own research I have found out 
that those historians who may/have supported Brexit have found themselves on the side-
lines. The prevailing view in British academia is in favour of Britain remaining part of the EU. 
It is also shown in terms of supporters of the two groups I have discussed, Historians for 
Britain wasn’t able to attract many supporters. Briefings for Brexit, was created with the aim 
of showing that not all academia supports remain, and they are many positive reasons, in 
their view, for Brexit.  
As I write, August 2018, the Brexit situation remains a very polarised one. I would argue that 
it isn’t just Brexit supporting historians who now suffer abuse. Those that choose to 
campaign for a, second referendum or, a ‘peoples vote’ a vote on the terms of Brexit also 
find themselves under the cosh. In terms of Brexit effecting relationships between historians 
I would say it has put them under strain. This is an area where further research could be 
done. As the situation is very fluid and has changed a lot since I began my research, it is 
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worth looking into further Perhaps this is best done in 2019 when Britain is supposed to 
leave the EU. Although this could also change, such is the nature of Brexit.              
 
If further research was to be carried out, I would suggest that more interviews were 
conducted, with historians from both sides as well as those who didn’t take part at all. This in 
itself isn’t easy, I found that out while working on this project. I didn’t hear back from 
everyone I contacted, and being based in Norway it wasn’t always easy to go to the UK to 
carry out research. Nonetheless, I would argue that this isn’t only an interesting area of 
research but also a very important one. It would be interesting to get a variety of historian’s 
views on the Brexit debate as well as their roles in it, if they played one. Important as I think 
it should be known or at least have some insights as to why Brexit supporting historians 
found themselves on the side-lines. Why do historians find themselves on the wrong end of 
abuse for being outspoken? Again, there are no easy answers but it is important, in my view, 
to have some insights as to why this is the case. Historians can add much needed context 
into future political debates. Therefore, the fact some felt they couldn’t get involved in the 
Brexit debate because their views went against the majority should be subject to further 
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Brief timeline of events 
 
 3rd July 2013: Historians for Britain letter published in the Times, a British national 
daily calling for ‘a better deal’ with the EU. Twenty-two academics signed this letter. 
By the time of the referendum Historians for Britain had forty-five supporters.  
 12th March 2015: Mary Beard and David Abulafia appear on the BBCs Daily Politics 
show. Both discuss what historians have to say about the UK’s past and present 
relationship with its closet neighbours.  
 11th May 2015: David Abulafia has letter published in History Today where he sets 
out the case for Historians for Britain. Britain: apart from or apart from Europe? The 
‘Historians for Britain’ campaign believes Britain’s unique history sets it apart from 
the rest of Europe. This letter caused controversy and it wasn’t long until other 
academics responded. 
 18th May 2015: Various historians sign a counter letter to David Abulafia’s. The 
counter letter was also published in History Today. Fog in the Channel, Historians 
Isolated. Over three-hundred historians signed this letter, it called into question the 
arguments Abulafia had made one week earlier. This letter was also published on 
Academics for Britain in Europe website. 
 22nd May 2015: The Guardian a British national daily newspaper ran an editorial on 
historians in the Brexit debate.  
 25th July 2015: The Economist a weekly magazine-format newspaper ran a column 
on historian’s involvement in the Brexit debate. 
 23rd June 2016: Brexit referendum in the United Kingdom. Leave won but the margin 
was small 51.9% of voters voted Leave with 48.1% voting Remain.  
 Unsure of the precise dates but sometime in late 2017 and into 2018. The original 
website of Historians for Britain was taken down as well as Academics for Britain in 
Europe. Some Historians for Britain became supporters of Briefings for Brexit. This is 
a group of academics who make the case for Brexit to be carried through vigorously. 
Academics for Britain in Europe have a new website (Academics for Europe). The 
group continues to make a passionate pro-European case. Their hope is that 
Britain’s future relationship with the EU is as close as possible or that Brexit is 








Taken from the first page of the Historians for Britain 
website. 
 
Their original web address has now been bought by someone else.  
Historians for Britain is an independent, non-partisan group established by Business for 
Britain, to represent the historians and academics who believe in a renegotiation of Britain’s 
relationship with the European Union, backed up by an In/Out referendum. The group was 
founded in July 2013 when twenty-two of Britain’s leading historians wrote to the Times to 
throw their support behind the campaign for a renegotiation of Britain’s EU membership. 
Signatories included Professor David Abulafia, Lord Lexden and Professor Robert Tombs. 
Historians for Britain aims to achieve its objectives via quality research and set-piece 
seminars and lectures, which will demonstrate that leading historical thinkers have serious 
reservations about Britain’s current relationship with the EU and want a better deal for our 
country. Members of the Historians for Britain Board include:  
  Professor David Abulafia (Chairman) – Professor of Mediterranean History, 
Cambridge University  
   Dr Sheila Lawlor – Director, Politeia  
   Dr Andrew Roberts – Author and historian  







Extract from Oliver Lewis essay, Lessons from the 1975 EU 
renegotiation.  (Refers to footnotes 163-167).  
Foreword  
 
Oliver Lewis’ fascinating account of the attempt to renegotiate Britain’s relationship with the 
Common Market, or EEC, is both a well-researched piece of history and an essay that 
makes one sit up and think about current discussions concerning Britain’s place in what is 
now known as the European Union. We can see similar splits within the two major political 
parties, though in 1975 Labour was more deeply divided than the Conservatives and now it 
is probably the other way around, though under the present leader Labour policy remains 
rather vague. This is particularly apparent when we look at Labour (and Liberal Democrat) 
attitudes to a referendum, which are hedged about with conditions that link a promise to 
listen to the nation with major changes within the EU affecting existing treaties. But it is also 
apparent when we look at the lack of precision shown in discussions about renegotiation.  
It is becoming more and more obvious that a fundamental aspect of renegotiation is 
convincing the EU that it has to change: it is not simply a question of Britain’s relationship 
with Europe, or that of any other countries that might be tempted to follow suit; it is also 
necessary to recognize that the political structures and economic relationships that have 
come into being in Europe have become unsatisfactory for many members. Above all, it is 
important to recognize that the ‘European project’ is a dangerously vague concept, 
especially for states (of which the United Kingdom is not the only one) that value their 
distinctive identity, expressed through their history, culture and legal system, not to mention 
economic profiles that differ enormously from state to state. There is no single European 
political culture.  
The situation in 1975 was in many ways quite different. The ‘European project’ had not 
advanced as far as it has in the last couple of decades, following Maastricht and Lisbon. The 
arguments were still largely concerned with a Common Market and Britain’s wish to maintain 
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economic ties with Commonwealth countries, particularly New Zealand. As under Margaret 
Thatcher, there was always the problem of how much Britain should be paying into the 
European coffers. Britain’s relatively small and efficient agricultural sector did not fit well 
alongside that of France. Moreover, the Wilson years were a time of successive economic 
crises, such as the devaluation of the pound that had already occurred in 1968, when the 
Prime Minister appeared on television to impress the public with the argument that ‘the 
pound in your pocket’ is still worth the same amount. Wilson, of course, was a consummate 
operator. As Oliver Lewis’ essay shows, Wilson shamelessly excluded Peter Shore and 
Anthony Wedgwood Benn (as he was once known) from his European strategy.  
Historians are rightly wary of preaching lessons from the past. Even allowing for the great 
differences between Europe in 1975 and Europe in 2014, or 2017 if that turns out to be the 
date of a referendum, the fundamental issues raised in this paper should not be forgotten: 
renegotiation has to achieve real results; the presentation of the case for and against has to 
be fair and balanced. This account of Harold Wilson’s canny contriving’s does indeed leave 
one uneasy. But he was that type of Prime Minister.  
David Abulafia FBA  
Cambridge University  
 
Over the next few months, officials were not only busy discussing renegotiation with their 
European colleagues but were also busy working out the scope of renegotiation, moulding 
an agreement that would let the Prime Minister show something had changed, while 
preventing any substantial change. Among officials it was – and still is – referred to as a “so-
called renegotiation.”101 Proposals that would require Treaty change were “amended”.102 
In FCO reports, officials described how they were focussed on “the degree to which they 
seem likely to achieve our policy directive. The chances of getting them accepted... [and] 
problems of presentation at home and abroad.”103 The first two points show the limits that 
defined the FCO’s approach, the last point makes it clear that their mind was always on how 
they could pitch the renegotiation to a home audience. In a very frank note officials declared 
“British policy in and towards Europe [has] had a single, over-riding objective: the creation of 
conditions for a successful referendum.”104  




101 Interview between Oliver Lewis and Sir Michael Butler, 22 July 2013   
102 Confidential memo on renegotiation, released to Business for Britain via FOI request   
103 Draft paper by the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary for ECS, FCO 30/2387, TNA 
  
104 Permanent Under-Secretary’s Planning Committee: Objectives for British foreign policy 





Interview with Oliver Lewis 2nd February 2018, London.   
 
In your view what is the role of the historian in modern society? 
 
That's an interesting question. Basically, as bit of background, I was the person who came up 
with the idea of the Historians for Britain. I was a director of research for an organization called 
Business for Britain. Now Business for Britain had been set up by a guy called Matthew Elliot 
who went on to be CEO of the Vote Leave Campaign, and I was director of research. Business 
for Britain had been set up with a very clear idea that a EU referendum was coming, and that 
basically we had several years to address structural problems that, the Leave Campaign 
would have. Before that and that reason was basically that the business community, especially 
the CBR, the Confederation for Treasury who had been seen to be pro-EU. So, we just said 
we have to get business people on board to basically say actually we're not happy with the 
EU membership, we've got to go in a different direction etc. 
 
As we were doing that it struck me that actually it wasn't just business that we needed to get 
on-board it was also academia. So basically, the nightmare scenario I had in my mind as the 
referendum began and in the same way our fear had been that business wants to stay. The 
fear would be that the smart people and the academics want to stay. So, we thought okay, 
actually we've got to get out in the same way, and we thought the obvious profession to target 
academia was historians, they were two reasons for this. The first is that they are as it were 
proper academics who understand, the history of the UK, its relationship with Europe and also, 
I think it's all about context and rich arguments for why Britain would be okay outside of the 
EU. I think they will be able to effectively argue that Britain before England and Scotland had 
been independent for centuries. And I said there's a slight real politic argument in it as well, 
which is just these would be extremely smart people and it would basically show that at the 
very least, people who are highly educated were split on the issue. 
 
So basically, I say the role of historian, it's two roles basically one is as an academic, as a 
proper scrutinizer of the past and truth seeker, which makes them highly credible. The 
second role which is slightly more abstract, it's almost like they are the guardians of the past, 
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at least in the public's eye. They are the people who had the most authority and can say this 
is what happened, and that sort of custodianship on the past.  
 
How did historians respond to the Brexit debate (in particular Historians for Britain)? 
  
Basically, there was two distinct phases for that. The first was the preliminary phase which 
was before David Cameron won the 2015 election. So that sort of like 2013 to 2015, and 
there you had a proper engagement by historians which was really interesting. We'd have all 
these dinners, we'd invite lots and lots of historians over. And it's basically two ways they 
responded, the first was to engage very thoroughly in the conversation and talk about the 
nature of Britain and Europe, to talk about their role as historians and whether or not they 
should be talking about it. And we'd had lots of historians who were pro-European as well 
and they said actually I'm a big believer in this, I think it's the natural narrative of our... which 
was interesting. We also found that there was a reluctance by many to get involved in the 
political game at all, and you know they would say, I completely agree with you, I 
completely... however, I don't want to be part of the political… 
 
Interviewer: Yes, because the majority of the historians were silent, Historians for 
Britain only had 45 supporters  
 
Yeah, we only did have a few dozen, they were top names. We really went for quality over 
quantity. There was also left right splits, I would say. We found it quite tricky to find left-
winged historians who were Eurosceptic, interestingly, it was definitely people of a more 
wide-leaning persuasion who had been more... the obvious was David Starkey and... so that 
was the first phase. Then it all changed when referendum campaign actually began, and 
that's when suddenly, a lot of historians suddenly became very, very vocal about Historians 
for Britain. And basically, saw escalation of claims which frankly in my opinion were 
ridiculous, nationalists trying to like distort history etc. I remember one blog post by someone 
and he says, if you look at the Historians for Britain website one of the documents they have 
is a huge history of England. This shows the nationalist like agenda, well I bought that 
website, it was a stock quota of a website. But as I was saying there was this all quite 
intense escalation. (Referring to Academics for Britain in Europe and other pro-European 
groups.) And a lot of people, I would say, some were distinguished like Simon Schama, but 
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a lot of people who were not particularly distinguished in the field I would argue, so they got 
hundreds rather than dozens. And I would argue that the position they took was, it was a 
typical referendum campaign, it was very polarized and there was a lot of this in their 
arguments. It wasn't informed by a proper, substantial case in the same way that Historians 
for Britain was. The main thing they engaged in was basically trying to attack Historians for 
Britain on nationalist grounds. The Guardian, they did an editorial on David Abulafia who 
was our chairman. And the whole attacking it as sort of a nationalist conspiracy. So yeah, 
and at that point it became much harder to get people to... it both became harder in some 
respects because people basically said Historians for Britain is awful. But there were some 
historians and the who actually came out the woodwork as a result and said yes, I will 
support you Gwythian Prins, for instance. And it was a such a degree of free advertising that 
came, so they were both two very interesting phases.  
 
Historians for Britain was slightly different, Historians for Britain was genuinely probing 
negotiations. In order to get on these top historians on-board, we would let it be genuinely 
pro negotiation. We didn't know which side it was going to fall after a referendum was called, 
there was a chance that Historians for Britain would have gone the other side. We had a 
vote and the overall number did come back and said yes, I will be voting to leave and 
therefore, Historians for Britain became one of the public endorsers of the Vote Leave 
campaign. 
 
You point out that the media had a largely positive view on Europe in your essay, 
‘Lessons from the 1975 EU renegotiation’. However, the medias view on Europe 
changed over time to what Oliver Daddow terms ‘permissive consensus to 
destructive dissent’ Do you think todays Eurosceptic media helped Historians for 
Britain in their campaign? 
 
To certain extent…, it was definitely a huge help. I think we had media who had seen 
through a lot of the pro-European arguments. As far as the historians were concerned, yes it 
was helpful because--well for two reasons. The first is the press became polarized in the 
same sort of way I described, so you had on one side Daily Mail, the Sun, (Eurosceptic) and 
the other the Guardian and the Independent (pro-European). In this respect, it was useful for 
us because you had one side who were only too willing to give you the historians arguments 
as we deploy them. And one of the things that we found in addition to provide intellectual 
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arguments, intellectual credibility, what it also did was it allowed us to provide answers to a 
few very tricky questions. So, one of the tricky questions was the EU is responsible for 
peace in Europe from then on whenever journalists said, how do we respond to this claim? 
We would say well here's the collection of essays by top historians saying that this is a myth. 
And so, it provided the argument by... in that respect it was good that we had media who are 
willing to engage with us a lot more than they would have been in the 1970s. And then we 
were able to deploy our arguments there, but on the other there was the Guardian and the 
Independent. Who were in some ways inversely making our case because they would be 
reporting on some of the History Today stuff and the historians kept on the other side 
attacking. So, in that respect they were inadvertently acting as soapbox as well. 
 
What motivated Historians for Britain to come together in the first place? 
 
It was definitely not inspired by anything in particular. The only like inspiring thing I have is I 
remember reading... I was doing some research on the AV referendum. And a bunch of 
historians had come together to write a letter for that for the campaign, and that was just a 
letter. And so that was the initial fall, well let's do a letter initially, and then as we were doing 
the letter, I thought well why don't we just carry on and see if we can build something from 
this as a result. And then we did the branding and I think Matthew Elliot basically said go 
ahead, see what you can build. 
 
What type of organisation was Historians for Britain (a think-tank, a campaign 
group?), how did you view yourselves? 
 
That's a very interesting question and I think it's a mixed hybrid of the two. I suppose you 
can call it and advocacy group. 
 
David Abulafia gave an extremely good definition of what Historians for Britain was, which 
was it was a chance for historians to basically engage in a contemporary issue and provide 
a context which was otherwise lacking. And which in this particular instance, was needed. In 
that respect it's not quite right, to call it a think- tank even though it had aspects of think 
tankery, like producing the reports and the holding of seminars. But it wasn't quite 
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necessarily a full-on advocacy group as well in that it was lobbying to say, it was just trying 
to inject an intellectual well-reasoned, well-sourced argument into the debate. And I'd say it 
worked. 
 
Who were your target audience? 
 
The general public. 
 
You say in your view the campaign was a great success, would you like to elaborate 
on that? 
 
The narrative was extremely successful because it was able to insert itself quite 
strategically. I've written an article for this you should remind me and email me, and I'll send 
it to you for Conservative History Magazine like a few months ago. Basically... the dynamic 
is dozens of historians who signed up, it keeps on growing over time. So, it's Britain and 
that's your first phase pre-May 2015. And what happens is that the journalists, initially they 
go well what is this? You know I remember it being pitched and they go we're historians why 
do we care? But then we produced the first batch of essays and we sent it out on email, and 
the responses started coming from journalists which was can you send us a hard copy? I've 
never actually been asked for a hard copy of a report before, this is really interesting. And 
they would report on it and they would come up and Historians for Britain reports would 
come up in the press and they would do... and that argument started to change. You could 
tell there was this intangible shift in the way the EU was represented by journalists, which 
was look, businesses are split and academics are split. Which meant that when the 
remaining side really kicked into gear post-general election, and they ran this through the 
historians, sure they were able to get a lot more than we were, but the narrative had been 
set. It was always going to be historians are split, academics are split. I mean we basically... 
the way we, the very crude way we looked at the campaign in those early days. Obviously, a 
lot more sophisticated but when you think about it, it's almost like a chess board, and each 
square represents a group. The question is which groups do you win on and which groups 
do you lose on? So, for example, business we're set to lose, so how can we instead of losing 
make it a draw. Because if people think it's a draw then that the says we should leave, so it's 
a win. So as far as possible you wanted that... so if you can imagine it almost being red for 
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we're goanna lose, yellow for split, and green if we win. And you'd want that chess board 
basically to have no red. So, with Historians for Britain was to turn a red square to a yellow 
square, turning a group which at the beginning everyone said it's united by the European 
Project into a split European Project, and I'd argue we were successful. 
 
Do you think Historians for Britain could have done more to attract more supporters? 
 
Maybe. I mean, the thing with Historians for Britain it was completely different on the 
academic scene and the political scene. There was many in academia who responded very 
badly to it because not just they disagreed with politics, but they disagreed with that this was 
the role of the historians. I remember getting some push-back from various people saying, 
the role of historians is not to be active in modern society, their place is firmly in the past. 
That definition of a historian that I disagreed with, because I think they do have a role to 
play, everyone has a role to play in... 
 
It also it sort of misses you know the Marxist legacy of certain people like Christopher Hill 
and you know others, who basically were a lot more active in politics admirably so, as we've 
known their politics. So, there was people saying actually this is not the role of historians, 
yada. I think what Historians for Britain did do, everyone for one day will be resurrected in 
some way, shape, or form, it made the idea of being involved respectful. Respectful may be 
the wrong word, it made it real again because people could say you know, the enemy of 
Historians for Britain, the people that were saying that there's no way that we agree with 
these guys. They're wrong in their perception of history, they're closet racist etc. The one 
thing they couldn't deny is that we're making an impact. So, I wouldn't say respectable 
because even though I thought Historians for Britain were eminently respectable in 
everything we produced and said with those who disagreed. But it made historians once 
again active, and I think there was that shift. In the same way that you know you’re writing a 
thesis after it, in that respect, it was a success, maybe the failure is that we didn't carry on 
post referendum in that respect. And it is a... sadly life takes hold after, I just simply don't 
have the time to carry it on. Which is a source of disappointment and maybe one day the 




Few Historians for Britain supporters were historians of modern Europe, do you 
think this is something which should have been addressed? 
 
I mean as I said we, there was a few things what we went for, the main one was quality. The 
first criteria were serious academic credentials, not necessarily well known to the public. But 
people who were without a doubt at the top of their game within the academy, that was 
David Abulafia you know, head of history at Cambridge author of numerous books and 
winner of all sorts of prestigious awards. And the wonderful thing about David Abulafia was 
even when they were throwing vitriolic hate at him from the other side, they couldn't dispute 
the fact that this was an extraordinarily serious historian, far more accomplished than the 
vast majority of theirs. Not an attention seeker, but a really serious person. The second 
criteria were completely different, it was historians who the public knew about and that was 
David Starkey.  
 
So, it was basically in that respect we posed a win win, a dream... it was wonderful to have, 
for example, at our events, photos of David Starkey next to David Abulafia because you 
ticked the two boxes. The academy would have taken it seriously and the public will have 
taken it credibly. 
 
I mean beyond that, I was interested in getting a left right split personally, I thought it was 
important to show political consensus. We did have some left-wing historians, but not as 
many I would have liked. And then on... there was a lot of concern about wanting a gender 
balance. Unfortunately, this wasn’t possible and certainly wasn’t for the lack of trying.  
 
The focus was overall quality more than anything else. We did have Europeans who Ana 
Abulafia, David Abulafia's wife is European, she was on board. And yeah, we welcomed 
people from all over, we also had Americans on board so Ted Burma from Yale was on 
board as well. So, we did definitely go for like the international cause that was one of the 
philosophies that we knocked in. It was that we went in and we saw Europe as a... in many 




Just over a quarter of Historians for Britain supporters had an affiliation with 
Oxford or Cambridge is there any particular reason for this degree of 
concertation? 
 
Purely because that's where I had most of the links, I studied at Oxford so I knew a bunch of 
historians there and when I still went and saw old tutors they would say well go down the 
road and talk to so and so, and so and so. And to that lead to some good results, yes, you're 
probably right there was a certain degree of concentration as a result. Not deliberately, 
purely that majority of being an entrepreneur is that you have to deal with what you've got. 
 
Would you describe Historians for Britain as non-partisan? 
 
Oh definitely 100%, 100% like it was as I said it was very clear that we... if you look at the 
original letter we sent to the Times, and then if you go on to our website--I'm not sure if our 
website is still up online, if there's a copy of it anywhere. 
 
There's a big pounding statement and that is big if I remember rightly is on non-partisanship 
and on different schools of thought. And there's certainly I mean it wasn't even 100% 
guaranteed that they were going to back the Leave referendum. It was meant to be more 
than anything else, a chance for historians to inject an intellect core perspective into a 
debate, into a crucial debate which needed that. 
 
Do you think the Brexit debate effected the community’s historians in Britain? Did 
it put strain on relationships? 
 
Oh yeah but I can't go into details but I knew of certain who had felt under pressure from 
certain people as a result of that and you know had disagreements as a result of it. And you 
know if you think about it I mean, if you think about it, with David Abulafia, I mean here's one 
of the most distinguished historians of our time and to actually know that The Guardian have 
done a hit job exactly you know it was immensely to their personal and their intellectual 
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credit, that they persevered and marched on. And you know I honestly think that, especially 
with the referendum result. The role that they played making this happen is valuable. 
 
 
Did you read about Niall Ferguson, famously changing his mind? 
 
Yes, he did. He ignored all of our emails that we sent him. He was approached from the first 
letter all the way back, in fact we actually delayed it a little bit because we thought we got 
through the secretary and she said yes, I'll get to you just hold on. And nothing happened. 
 
I mean you know remind me, yeah now it reminds me of just how frustrating some of it was 
but no, it's obviously great to have him on board. Besides he's a very distinguished historian 
and yeah, it just-- 
 
And also, I'd argue that he was my point to that degree about the nature of those who 
oppose, in that you can tell post referendum how he's started to much more critically think 
and engage with the subject. I would argue that his reasoning post referendum, is far more 
you know well thought out and articulated it's immensely to his credit. 
 
And immensely to her credit, I would say to Mary Beard as well she had a very well-
reasoned argument like based on the Roman Empire heritage. So yeah, she is a good 









I mean I would want to disappear in two seconds so what I am curious about, is I suppose 
though, why Historians for Britain. Is there any reason you thought that'll be interesting to 
talk about? 
 
Me: Yeah just sort of I was searching around when I started studying my masters, just stuff 
to write it on... we had a historiography module at the start when we-- So then I wrote about, 
the historiography of Britain's relationship in the EU and, and then gradually I was 
searching around when I was writing and came to Historians for Britain website, and I 
thought this could be a really interesting thing to write the actual masters on so it kind of 





Oliver Lewis to Conservative history magazine 2018. 
 
The relationship between history and politics may be deep, but at times can be eerily 
uneasy. We want and expect our historians to analyse yesterday’s political debates - new 
books on figures such as Sir Robert Peel, Sir Winston Churchill and even parliamentary 
events like the Great Reform Act often appear on the shelves of our bookshops, with 
publishers quietly confident of a handsome return. But what happens when the historian 
turns his or her eye to the present? Do historians have a role to play in current political 
debate? 
 
Between 2014 and 2016 this question became a permanent fixture in my life as I sought to 
encourage some of Britain’s leading historical thinkers to engage in British politics. As the 
research director of Business for Britain (a role I would continue when the organisation 
transformed into the Vote Leave campaign) I had a firm view that historians had a key role to 
play in the EU debate. 
 
To my mind, there was one compelling reason to bring historians on-board - credibility. 
There was a desperate need in 2014 to bring academic, Eurosceptic voices into the debate. 
At that point, the academic community had a reputation for being uniformly pro-EU, a major 
handicap for the Eurosceptic cause. 
 
And so, with the support of some of the greatest historical minds of modern times, 
‘Historians for Britain’ was launched. Led by the exceptional Professor David Abulafia, the 
group immediately had a great deal of credibility. This respectability was only bolstered 
when our ranks were joined by other luminaries, such as Professor Robert Tombs, Dr 
Andrew Roberts, Dr David Starkey and Professor Gwythian Prins. 
 
The historians were clear - they were not ‘anti-Europe’, nor were they even ‘anti-EU’. What 
united them was a belief that the EU was headed in the wrong direction. Put in the context of 
Europe’s history, the policies of ‘ever closer union’ (which were then ravishing Greece) 
seemed at best foolhardy and at worst immoral. The historians pledged to support David 
Cameron’s mission of securing Treaty change in order to rewrite Britain’s troubled 




To make the point that ‘ever closer union’ was a historical nonsense, the historians released 
a batch of essays exploring the notion of a ‘European demos’. Fine original research 
demonstrated conclusively that there was no such thing as a ‘European identity’ and that the 
very idea was potentially dangerous (were it to follow a path similar to the emergence of 
Italian and German identities in the 19th Century). 
 
The publication of this first collection of essays and the announcement of the group was 
initially met with bafflement by many journalists. Rather than answering questions on the 
essays, I found myself facing questions like why would historians have a role to play in any 
political debate, let alone one as important as the question of Britain's membership of the 
EU? But the essays’ originality nonetheless garnered interest. After the initial puzzlement 
subsided, the essays were well received - and journalists were soon ringing the Business for 
Britain office, requesting hard copies to keep on their desks. By the time of the referendum, 
Historians for Britain had released four publications, covering topics ranging from the 1975 
referendum to the role of the EU in keeping peace in Europe. 
 
When the referendum began, it was The Economist which first noted the role that Historians 
for Britain had played in developing the credibility of the Eurosceptic cause. Lamenting the 
lack of an equivalent on the pro-EU side, the magazine noted the intellectual ‘star dust’ that 
the leave campaign was accumulating. The Guardian even devoted an alarmed editorial to 
the dangers of Historians for Britain - something we took as a big compliment. 
 
By the time the ‘Vote Leave’ campaign emerged from Business for Britain, it was clear that 
the Cameron Government’s promise of ‘full on Treaty change’ was never going to 
materialise. Faced with the choice of either leaving the EU or ‘ever-closer-union’, Historians 
for Britain pledged to support Vote Leave. 
 
While the pro-EU faction in the referendum did eventually assemble ‘Historians in for Britain’, 
it came far too late to make a real difference. Historians for Britain had become established 
in the media’s mind as the ‘go-to’ for intellectual comment. Within two years the media’s 
depiction of the academic community had shifted from being uniformly Europhile to split 
down the middle. After two years of work, one off the Eurosceptic cause’s biggest 
weaknesses had been removed. 
 
In a debate that was often rancorous and blighted with accusations of ‘dumbing down’, the 
historians provided a welcome oasis of detailed analysis, extended research and intellectual 
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rigorousness. In addition to shifting perception, I’d argue that Historians for Britain made the 
debate far more insightful and brought much-needed academic rigour to our political debate. 
If nothing else, I consider this a real success. 
 







Email Correspondence with Oliver Lewis, 18/09/2017.  
 
Paul Hemmer wrote: 
Hi Oliver, 
 
I am a masters in history student with the University of Bergen Norway. 
 
I have found some of the research published on the Historians for 
Britain website very interesting. 
 
I wonder if you could perhaps answer some questions for me which will 
help me in my master thesis. 
 
How and why was the campaign group established, and who were there 
driving forces behind this campaign? 
 
How did the campaign develop with regards to the general public as well 
as fellow historians? 
 




Great to hear from you. 
 
I helped set up the campaign while I was working for Business for Britain in 2013. I worked 
with Professor David Abulafia who was a real inspiration and driving force. I had the original 
idea of a letter of historians to go to the Times in 2013 
(https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/we-need-a-new-deal-on-europe-or-we-quit-say-
historians-g7q3vqvbnkn). While trying to get signatures I met Professor Abulafia, who was a 
great supporter and wanted to help rally Eurosceptics in academia in order to provide a 
historical perspective to the campaign for a looser relationship with the EU. I agreed to help 
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and this turned into Historians for Britain. 
 
 
The campaign was - in my view - a great success. It set the tone that academics were 
increasingly sceptical of the EU project. This gave support to the efforts for a renegotiation of 
Britain's EU membership and - when Cameron failed to secure this -  there was a vote of all 




This was important, as it meant that there was no united academic view during the 
referendum campaign. Efforts by 'Remain' to claim, in effect, that 'all smart people want 
Britain to stay in the EU' failed to convince anyone. 
 
 
At the same time, Historians for Britain produced material that articulated sensible concerns 
with the EU project. These concerns were picked up in the media and I think really went a 
long way towards improving the quality of the debate. If memory serves, the Economist did a 
very good bit on this. (There were accusations of jingoism by some, but this was based on a 








Interview with Paul Lay, 7th April 2017, London.  
 




Utterly. Utterly and completely irrelevant. Exactly the sheer lack of- It's like in this country 
now, when you talk about the lack of opposition, it's destroying the politics of this country. 
You need two sides to knock with gradations between. When it came to Brexit, I suppose it's 
drawn the worst of the two sides. There was one who was overwhelming and it was just 
catastrophic. And it's exactly the same here. You need a dialectic, you need to draw them 
against each other and it just didn't happen and so what? They lost. 
Because they won't propose to more people. And there were so many people from that kind 
of myriad, that intellectual class, who weren't prepared to make the case. They just thought it 
was hopeless. 
 
Do you think a more nuanced debate amongst historians may have improved the level 
of the debate? 
 
Yeah, I think it is really really important that historians should have done that. But they are 
not willing to do so. There was no-- when you shot down people as populist or racist, or 
anything but that, the debate ends. Once you start calling people racist, you place some kind 
of sentence which is somewhat an exaggeration like witchcraft. 
 
We were talking about it, I said Noah Malcolm. The man who was The Spectators foreign 
reporter in Yugoslavia during the time of its breakdown. He's risked his life, he speaks many 
languages, he speaks Albanian, apparently very elegantly. Indeed, a man who has just 
written the most extraordinary work about traders throughout Mediterranean, anything but a 
little Englander. They wanted to concentrate on using Hobbesian arguments of democracy 
and sovereignty that is people like Malcolm's arguments. And that's exactly the same. These 
are perfectly legitimate arguments but it's also perfectly legitimate to disagree with them. But 
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there was no intent to do so. That is what - it's just that the debate is very solemn. 
 
And despite any action I made, it is plainly not gonna happen.  
 
Did you make any reflections before you made your own views public in History 
Today? 
 
I have come to a point where I just think that the whole University system is shaking up.  
 
I think that humanities are in a really catastrophic place. I wonder if I was talking to a 
perspective undergraduate. I would say I need some increase in the case of the best 
historians were big with the languages. I'd say don't do it. Study Russian. Study Arabic. 
Study Chinese. Study French, German. 
 
And our world view has become so diminished that we need to go out into the world and 
think about what history is about. Because it's become the emphasis on microhistory the 
emphasis on social history. this means that we are missing the big picture. 
 
They are so concerned about the virtue, they are so concerned about sending out the right 
message, rather than doing what historians should do which is- When you finish a history 
lesson, a good history lesson. You, should feel the part, that's what I think. Never come out 
from a lecture thinking "that's what I should do".  
 
You should sit with it What do I think? That's what it's about. An endless questioning, and 
endless argument, and we've forgotten that we just want it to be handed down, facts, they 
often aren't facts but- It's almost as if historians have become memory men again. There's 
people saying, "when was the battle of… "who is the…."  
 
Yeah, it's very very passive. Let's start arguing again, and it was very depressing to a point 





Was there a lack of intellectual engagement? 
 
No there is nothing. There is nothing. And that's, that's the key problem. So, who can 
network well, they will search some people within Historians in Britain, their main problem is 
their name because what does that make Historians of Britain. Historians could mean 
anything. 
 
So, you have a chronology, that from my perspective starts with the original parts of our 
editorial which made points that I suppose was the kind of points about British and 
particularly English abstractionism that were made by our fellowmen in the 19th century- 
 
Which is a valid point. How important those - Well I don't know, but it's a perfectly valid thing 
to argue. It became clear this was not going to be okay. It's quite obvious after that, that the 
only people who were willing to debate were tenured white male, middle-aged, elderly, 
white. Noah Malcolm be perhaps the most articulate. This is a man who speaks 13 
languages. It's very very interesting that the people who were on the "leave" side were often 













Email correspondence with Abigail Green, 01/10/2017. 
 




I am a masters in history student with the University of Bergen in Norway. I am currently 
doing research for my master thesis. The main area of research for this is the campaign 
group called Historians for Britain. 
 
The research questions I currently have are; 
 
How and why was the campaign group Historians for Britain established, and who were the 
driving forces behind this campaign? 
 
How did the campaign develop with regards to the general public as well as fellow 
historians? 
 
I wonder if you have any insights into these questions you could share, I would be most 
grateful if you did. 
 
 




Thank you for your email. My feeling is that it would be wrong to describe Historians for 
Britain as a campaign group. I signed the first letter, which was essentially a call for 
renegotiation of the relationship between Britain and the EU taking into account especially 
the situation created by the Euro. I did not sign further letters because it became clear to me 
that the group was sponsored by an organisation called Business for Britain, and I felt I didn't 
134 
 
know enough about what that organisation's agenda was. However, I did not withdraw my 
name from Historians for Britain because whenever they sent me a copy of a communication 
I found it generally quite sensible.  
 
At one point a group of historians did produce a letter stating an alternative view, and I found 
myself disagreeing quite strongly with some elements of it which I thought were extremely 
naïve and ahistorical.  For instance, both as a Jew and a Jewish historian I found the idea 
that the Marconi scandal had been in any way equivalent to the Dreyfus Affair, or that 
Jewish life in Britain could be compared in any way with the Jewish experience in continental 
Europe in the 1930s and 1940s actually quite shocking. There were other things but that is 
the thing I now remember. I recall discussing this counter-letter with a couple of colleagues, 
neither of them associated with Historians for Britain, and both modern European historians 
who eventually voted Remain. They shared my concerns about it, and agreed that the 
Historians for Britain letter was misrepresented in it, because it was hard to argue with many 
of the things Historians for Britain said from a historical point of view. In short, rather than 
leaping to conclusions about the 'jingoistic' Historians for Britain agenda, I would urge you to 
read and reflect upon what the group actually said. I also very much objected to the 
assumption by colleagues circulating this counter-letter that other colleagues would 
inevitably agree with them. 
 
In the lead, up to the referendum campaign, those associated with the group were consulted 
about what stance it should take with regard to the different branches of the Leave 
campaign. At that point, David Abulafia (to my mind the leading force behind it) informed us - 
I think all of us, but I did encounter him at a college event so it might have been in person - 
that the balance of opinion was about 2/3 leave and 1/3 remain, and in his reply to me I think 
he indicated that he too had not yet made up his mind about how he would vote. That too 
suggests Historians for Britain was not a campaigning group. I think that neither the general 













I am a masters in history student based at the University of Bergen Norway. 
 
I am currently doing research for my thesis, the main topic for this is Historians for Britain. 
 
I wonder if you could perhaps shed some light into my research questions? 
 
How and why was Historians for Britain established, and who were the driving forces behind 
the group? 
 
How did the campaign develop with regards to the general public as well as fellow 
historians? 
 
What type of organisation was/is Historians for Britain? 
 
Did Historians for Britain change strategy and approach in the run-up/after the referendum? 
 
I would be most grateful if you have time to answer any of these. 
 
Robert Tombs Replied: 
 
 
I'm not sure I can be much help, as my association with the group was rather tenuous. I 
seem to remember I signed a collective letter to the press (which I didn't draft, but suggested 
some changes to, which were accepted), and wrote a historical piece for a pamphlet they 
published; in connection with that I attended a public meeting in London. Other than that, 




I was quite happy with the official position of the group, which was that Britain would 
probably stay within a reformed EU. But as no reforms were forthcoming, I hesitantly 
decided we should vote to leave (hesitantly, because of the complexity and difficulty of the 
process). My position now is strongly that the decision has been taken, and must be carried 
through vigorously. 
 
But someone who was far more involved, and closer to the origin of the group I think, was 
my colleague David Abulafia, who might be able to help you more. 
 
I'd be interested to know what you find out and say - but I suppose you'll be writing in 





Email Correspondence with A.W. Purdue, 16/10/2017. 
 
Paul Hemmer wrote: 
 
Dear Bill, 
I am a master in history student with the University of Bergen Norway. 
 
I am doing research for my master thesis on Historians for Britain. I 
have my bachelor from Northumbria and noticed you were visiting 
professor there. 
 
I was wondering if you could perhaps help me with some of my research 
questions? 
 
How and why was Historians for Britain established, and who were the driving forces behind 
the group? 
 
How did the campaign develop with regards to the general public as well 
as fellow historians? 
 
What type of organisation was/is Historians for Britain? 
 
Did Historians for Britain change strategy and approach in the run-up/after the referendum? 
 
I would be most grateful if you have time to answer any of these. 
 








There's almost certainly a Historians for Britain website which as details of formation of 
Historians for Britain but it's basically a group of mainly Conservative or conservative 
historians, though with some Eurosceptic Labour supporters. Professor David Abulafia is or 
was the chairman and Andrew Roberts, David Starkey and Sheila Lawlor, prominent 
supporters. I presume you've seen 'Peace-makers or credit takers' published during the 
referendum campaign, to which I contributed an essay.  The group was closely linked to 
Business for Britain and during the referendum campaign and, like it, was part of Vote 
Leave. It prided itself on taking a rational and analytical view as opposed to the more 
UKIPish and emotional organisation. 
 
Do let me know if you require any more info. I imagine that a Norwegian perspective is 










Email Correspondence with David Abulafia, 18/10/2017. 
 
Here are some brief answers. You should, though, look at the attached document, which 
shows our thinking at least in the early stages, especially on the effects of leaving - best 
wishes David Abulafia 
 
How and why was Historians for Britain established, and who were the driving forces 
behind the group? 
 
Historians for Britain was established when it became plain that the UK government 
intended to hold a referendum about membership of the EU.  It was funded by Business for 
Britain, an organization that took as its motto CHANGE OR GO. 
 
How did the campaign develop with regards to the general public as well as fellow 
historians? 
 
Initially we included both those who were certain the UK should leave the EU and others 
who argued for radical reform of the EU, in accordance with the theme of CHANGE OR 
GO.  When it became plain that the terms offered to David Cameron were very 
disappointing, some members decided they would nonetheless prefer to remain within the 
EU, but most decided that they had no option but to leave.  The Leavers then fell under the 
auspices of the national Leave campaign, into which Business for Britain merged. 
 
What type of organisation was/is Historians for Britain? 
 
A think-tank holding private and public meetings and discussions, with panels of historians 
and political figures. 
 
Did Historians for Britain change strategy and approach in the run-up/after the 
referendum? 
 
As explained, Historians for Britain initially included both Remainers and Leavers, and then 




Let me also add that there was a certain amount of publicity in the press - articles, letters, 
some of which stirred up controversy (e.g. in HISTORY TODAY magazine). 
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